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I.

INTRODUCTION

Waive (vb.): [T]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a
claim, privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or claim)
voluntarily.1
Can a defendant waive his right to appeal a death sentence?
Can a criminal suspect waive constitutional protections? Can an
individual waive, via contract, his right of freedom of association
or freedom of speech? Can a patient waive her right to informed
consent? How do we establish what rights can be waived? Of
those rights that can be waived, which actions, or decisions,
should be considered valid waivers of the right in question?
Waiver is a prominent concept in law and appears most
2
recognizably in criminal procedural law. But it also has
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (7th ed. 1999). I will use the generic term “right”
to refer to rights, claims, and entitlements. Resolution of debates about the correct
application of the term are not necessary for the argument proposed here and are beyond
the scope of this Article.
2. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977) (arguing that the doctrine of waiver must function to
ensure finality of convictions when such convictions are based on waiver of procedural
rights); David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U.
L. REV. 941 (1997) (discussing the rationale, standards, and constitutional scope of waiver
as a right in criminal procedure); Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable
Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1999) (discussing agreements
between prosecutors and criminal defendants that waive certain of the defendants’
constitutional protections, and arguing that the interests of third parties and the general
public may justify restrictions on these agreements); Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver,
Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978) (examining how
decisions by the Burger Court affect a criminal defendant’s ability to guard against the
loss of rights, including rights lost by waiver); Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A
Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1214 (1977) (discussing “the relationship between the concept of forfeiture and
the . . . notion of waiver”); Kenneth A. Goldman, Comment, Criminal Waiver: The
Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1262 (1966) (analyzing those factors that affect the binding nature of a
purported waiver, specifically as applied to the acts of the counsel, the defendant, and the
court). But see Richard C. Ausness, “Waive” Goodbye to Tort Liability: A Proposal to
Remove Paternalism from Product Sales Transactions, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (2000)
(arguing that waivers of tort liability should be permitted in the products liability
context); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511
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applications in insurance law,3 labor and employment law,4
mediation,5 property law,6 civil procedure,7 contract law,8 tort law,9
and fiduciary relationships.10 There are different requirements for
waivers of tort liability, statutory rights, criminal procedural rights,
and contractual conditions. Moreover, the term “waiver” is used to
refer to a variety of actions. For purposes of this Article, it includes
11
any action or decision by an individual to give up a right that is
currently functioning (for example, constitutional protections in the
Bill of Rights),12 as well as contractual agreements to give up future
rights or entitlements.
(1997) (discussing waiver in the context of informed consent to medical treatment and
research); Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952) (discussing
the waiver of the right to bring a negligence action according to the concept of assumption
of the risk); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1605 (1986) (advocating a framework for waiver decisions in civil litigation); Fred
C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998) (critiquing the rules
that govern client waiver of attorney conflicts of interest); Elysa Gordon, Note,
Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of Informed Waiver, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321 (1996) (proposing a doctrine of “informed waiver” in medical
decisionmaking to accommodate patients holding non-Western beliefs); Developments in
the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1629 (1985) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law] (discussing the function of implied waiver in privilege law).
3. See, e.g., 2 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:36, at 22-79 to 22-80 (3d ed.
1995); 13 id. § 194:21, at 194–29.
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion and the
Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1294–98 (1993) (explaining how age-based exit incentives lead
older workers to waive their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have
to? Do You Really Want to?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 269–73 (1994) (discussing waiver of
statutory rights in employment contracts).
5. See, e.g., 10A N.C. INDEX 4th, Divorced Separation § 527 (2002) (indicating that
North Carolina law allows the waiver of mandatory custody or visitation matters for
mediation, subject to a showing of good cause).
6. See, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homestead § 187 (1999) (describing scenarios under
property law in which homestead rights may be waived); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Waiver of Right to Enforce Restrictive Covenant by Failure to Object to Other Violations,
25 A.L.R. 5th 123 (1994) (discussing various ways in which restrictive covenants on land
use may be waived).
7. See, e.g., 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pleading §§ 329, 395 (2002).
8. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change:
Public and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 607, 609, 624–26.
9. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 2, at 294 (recognizing that waiver is permitted
“under principles of negligence and warranty law”).
10. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 821–22 (1983)
[hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (explaining that parties cannot waive a court’s
supervision over a fiduciary relation).
11. Waiver, in this sense, is a unilateral act. See Snyder, supra note 8, at 626–27
(distinguishing waivers from modifications, which are agreements).
12. Dix, supra note 2, at 205 (“[W]aiver should be defined as . . . a conscious choice
made by a person whose right is at issue.”). Compare this with the doctrine of forfeiture.
Refer to notes 104–07 infra and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Article argues that the concept of autonomy can
be developed into a framework that will provide a more precise way
of understanding waivers. Part III develops the conceptual
framework in more detail, identifying the elements necessary for a
valid waiver in specific circumstances. This Article stresses that the
determination of whether, and how, a right can be waived depends
13
on the nature of the right in question and its implications for
individual autonomy. The final part of the Article considers the
application of the framework in different contexts. The goal is not to
provide a detailed analysis of all possible legal waivers—production
of such a tome is beyond the scope of this Article—but rather to
suggest a unifying framework under which to analyze waivers.
Although examples are drawn from numerous areas of law, this
Article will leave the detailed application of the framework to
experts in the relative legal subspecialties.
The academic literature contains numerous discussions of
waiver, almost all of which have been limited to a specific area of
law.14 None has provided an overarching theory satisfactorily
explaining why courts have set different standards for achieving a
valid waiver in different legal contexts.15 Although such meta-

13. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining that what suffices
for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue). “[W]hether certain procedures are
required . . . and whether the . . . choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend
on the right at stake.” Id.
14. Refer to notes 2–10 supra and accompanying text. This Article draws from each of
these theories, as well as to parallels that can be drawn to discussions of the inalienability of
particular rights. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983) (discussing waiver in terms of inalienability). For an excellent
general summary of the inalienability debate, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1477–89 (1989). Professor Sullivan identifies four theories
that support inalienability: paternalism, efficiency, distribution, and personhood. Id. at 1477,
1479–86. Paternalism concerns function in the waiver context as well because a
nonautonomous waiver should not be considered valid. See id. at 1480–81. Moreover,
personhood concerns are analogous to the concept of ascriptive autonomy. Efficiency concerns
come into play under the headings of system issues and some across-the-board limitations of
waivers of descriptive autonomy. Distribution concerns are also dealt with under descriptive
autonomy.
15. Thus far there has been only one attempt at a comprehensive theory of waiver. See
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981). Edward
Rubin proposes that “rights . . . are structuring devices; they can be relinquished only if
acceptable alternative means of structuring the relationship are employed.” Id. at 537.
According to Rubin, valid waivers “require that parties who waive a particular right obtain the
functional equivalent of that right in the context of their more informal interaction.” Id. Rubin
uses the example of adjudication rights to demonstrate the implications of his theory and
suggests that, because their purpose is to assure due process protection, the waiver in question
should likewise achieve the functional due process equivalent. Id. at 537–39. This translates
into requirements that waivers reach the type of result that a court could have reached.
Moreover, Rubin states that the waiver must afford the functional equivalent of notice and a
hearing, and that the parties must know the right is being waived and they must negotiate the
waiver. Id. at 539. One problem with Rubin’s theory is his apparent contradiction in
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theories have their limitations, proposal of a general framework for
analyzing waiver should help better clarify what standards should
be applied to waivers and what waivers should be allowed. In
addition, providing a common language to analyze waiver issues
will help avoid compartmentalization of law. It will enable both
similar treatment of similar issues and a better understanding of
distinctions made between dissimilar issues.
Of the specific theories of waiver that have been suggested,
many rely on efficiency or other law and economics rationales for
evaluating waivers.16 While my work does not come out of this
tradition, my approach is not uncongenial to the general law and
economics approach. First, as will be seen, my approach hinges on
an analytical method designed to maximize individual autonomy,
and law and economics is, above all, a methodology for maximizing
values. Second, I do not believe that the autonomy value that sits at
the center of this analytical framework is far removed from the
acknowledging that the advantage to many alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is their
potential to reach results that are novel, see id. at 488–89, and his requirement that the
process substituted by the waiver achieve a result that a court could have reached if it had
adjudicated the matter, see id. at 480, 536–40. Nonetheless, Rubin’s theory is attractive. It
provides a conceptual framework that, in theory, applies across different waiver contexts. But
although I agree with his definition of rights as a “means of regulating relationships between
individuals or between individuals and the state,” and also that “[t]o incorporate this view of
rights, a theory of waiver should take account of the entire situation in which the waiver
occurs,” see id. at 529, I do not believe that this is the end of the analysis. Rubin’s theory
focuses too much on the process protections that rights serve, and not enough on the
substantive analysis of the nature of the right itself. So, although he acknowledges that in each
case one must determine the “nature of the right that has been waived” and “the kind of
protection that the right provides,” id. at 537, his theory is most well-developed in the context
of criminal procedural rights around adjudication, and fails to explain adequately why there
are other rights that can or cannot be waived and the standards that should adhere to these
waivers. In particular, he labels civil law rights unrelated to adjudication “amorphous” and
notes that there is “no single policy that governs the substantive rules that affect private
agreements.” Id. at 540. In contrast, this Article argues that autonomy functions as a guiding
overarching principle for both criminal and civil law.
16. Ausness, supra note 2, at 298, 301–04 (arguing that waivers of strict liability for
products should be allowed because they promote economic efficiency); Dix, supra note 2, at
216–19 (listing the interests that must be accommodated by a theory of waiver); Kaplan &
Dixon, supra note 2, at 953–54 (examining how standards in criminal procedure differ based on
the system’s needs to promote truth-seeking); King, supra note 2, at 117 (arguing that criminal
litigation waivers outside of plea bargains should only be restricted if there are public or thirdparty interests which override the litigants interests); Kronman, supra note 14, at 766–74
(positing that contract limitations on waiver are based on, among other things, economic
efficiency concerns); Spritzer, supra note 2, at 481, 488 (discussing how, in criminal procedure,
the standard for not applying strict safeguards around waivers is whether such safeguards
would be impracticable); Westen, supra note 2, at 1261 (concluding that waiver is part “of the
broader principle of forfeiture” and depends on the interests of the state); Zacharias, supra note
2, at 420 (positing that conflicts of interest rules for professionals may be unwaivable to ensure
that the adversary system functions appropriately); Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don’t End It:
The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession’s
Professionals, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 291, 308 (1998) (discussing that conflicts of interest rules in
bankruptcy may be nonwaivable because of public interest).
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kinds of values promoted by efficiency analyses, which are based on
respect for the preferences of individuals.17 But whereas efficiency (or
other) concerns should play a role, they alone are not determinative
because they fail adequately to explain why there are different
standards for waiver in different circumstances.18
19
This Article argues that autonomy is a better basis for
20
understanding waivers of individual rights. Autonomy is the basic
17. See, e.g., Bailey H. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the
Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990) (examining the link between autonomy and economic
theory). Libertarianism stresses the link between law and economics and autonomy. But cf. G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1993) (arguing that the
modern Court relies primarily on notions of efficiency, while the Lochner Court emphasized
autonomy). Professor Shell advocates a combined approach incorporating efficiency concerns, along
with “sensitivities to context and an appreciation of the limits of markets in allocating important
human and economic rights.” Id. at 518. Labeled “Pragmatic Contract Theory,” it is a mixture of
neoclassical theory and libertarian views. Id. at 518–19.
18. Shell, supra note 17, at 515–16 (noting an economic efficiency approach to contracts
“provides no principled basis for distinguishing between alienable and inalienable rights”).
19. Although respect for the value of autonomy is widely espoused by liberal theory, it has
multiple meanings and practical implications. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120–21 (4th ed. 1994); THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 35 (1998). The term “autonomy” translates literally as “self-rule,” but
such a simplistic definition does little to identify a concrete goal towards which to work in shaping
our societal system of individual rights. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra, at 120–21. Professor
Rogers Smith argues that initial conceptions of autonomy, both legal and philosophical, appeared to
focus on liberty. Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 176–78
(1982) [hereinafter Smith, Constitution and Autonomy]. The Framers of the Constitution were
concerned with creating a liberal democratic state that allowed individuals freedom from
government interference such that they could pursue certain objectives defined by reason. Id.
Autonomy, in this sense, functions as a means to achieve a certain end—rational decisionmaking—
and thus, the concept itself is shaped or limited by the goal—rationality. See id. at 178. If people are
rational beings in Kantian terms, then they should “want” to maximize rationality, because this is a
rational position. Id. at 195. In other words, Kant’s conception of autonomy was necessarily limited
by rationality because an irrational person or act was by definition not autonomous. See id. at 195–
96. Rationality, under this theory, is an independently established notion. People do not agree or
disagree as to its content. Dan Brock discusses this problem in his critique of rights-based limitations
on paternalism. Dan Brock, Paternalism and Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM 248 (Rolf
Satorius ed., 1983). He stresses that a rational person should welcome interference with decisions
when the interference will result in better promoting the individual’s good. Id. Norman Dahl rebuts
Brock’s assertion and argues that Brock needs to consider an expanded notion of rationality.
Norman O. Dahl, Paternalism and Rational Desire, in PATERNALISM, supra, at 261. According to
Dahl, if it is rational to act on one’s own choices, and this position can be universalized, under
Kantian theory, then it is irrational to interfere with an individual acting on his choices, even if to do
so would be beneficial because that position could not be universalized. Id. at 267–68. Thus, there are
rational rights-based limitations on paternalistic action. Id. at 267.
Professor Smith argues that the initial conception of the Framers is no longer valid, and
he advocates instead that autonomy must be thought of in broader terms as freedom to develop
individual intellect and emotion. Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra, at 184 (citing Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927)). This view of autonomy is a particularly Western, or American, view. JESSICA W. BERG ET
AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 14–15 (2d ed. 2001). For a view
that this Western concept of autonomy presents difficulty for patients with non-Western beliefs, see
Gordon, supra note 2.
20. This Article distinguishes between waivers that relate to individual autonomy and those
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value underlying liberal society. 21 In liberal theory,
maximizing autonomy is the ultimate goal and governmental
interference is appropriate only to the extent that it facilitates
22
this goal. A focus on facilitating autonomy above all else
represents the extreme position: minimum limitations on
individual rights of decisionmaking and maximum restrictions
on societal (governmental) interference. Other theories, such
as those that promote beneficence or communitarian goals,
provide different reasons to restrict individual waiver
decisions;23 but only autonomy both provides an appropriate
baseline from which to work and reflects factors that the
courts and legislatures actually consider in analyzing
24
waivers. Although other rationales may help explain legal
rules in specific contexts, a focus on maximizing autonomy
provides a descriptively valid basis for analysis and also a
normative framework that can be applied across different
areas. Not only has our society already demonstrated a
commitment to this goal,25 but there are significant
26
psychological benefits for individuals under such a system.
that have implications for others. Refer to notes 33–37 infra and accompanying text.
21. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in MILL: TEXTS COMMENTARIES 50 (Alan Ryan
ed., 1997). For various views on autonomy and liberalism, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN,
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1995); LIBERALISM AND
ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). This Article will begin with the assumption that
autonomy forms the basis for our system of laws and does so appropriately.
22. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1712 (1992) (describing how autonomy is “a value that infuses the
Constitution . . . [and] is a central principle of much of our ethical and political theory”).
Winick concludes that, although there are problems with an autonomy model, the
conception of “the individual as an autonomous decisionmaker . . . is a useful foundation
upon which to build a legal system . . . [and] to place limitations on governmental power.”
Id. at 1769.
23. This Article does not examine these other theories in detail. For example,
acceptance of communitarian ideals may lead to additional restrictions on individual
control over decisionmaking based on promoting community values and needs, and thus,
additional restrictions on individual waivers in light of these goals. So, too, may
utilitarian theory because the “greatest good for all” may be achieved by limiting
individual rights in certain circumstances. Refer to note 29 infra (discussing
utilitarianism). Although other theories do not necessarily result in further limitations on
individual rights or autonomy, each has the potential to do so given its underlying goal.
Liberal theory, by contrast, is the least restrictive of individual rights and autonomy, and
thus, provides an appropriate baseline from which to begin an analysis of waiver.
24. Refer to Part II infra.
25. Id.
26. Winick stresses that there are psychological benefits of allowing people to make
their own choices and that, because we have adopted a liberal system of government in
the United States, “[a]utonomy . . . should be presumptively protected by our law, and
government should bear a heavy burden of justification when it seeks to interfere with an
individual’s choice.” Winick, supra note 22, at 1771. These benefits include avoiding
encouraging “learned helplessness” behavior, promoting self-efficiency and responsibility,
increasing personal satisfaction leading to better performance and motivation to succeed.
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Moreover, there is a strong argument that commitment to
individual autonomy is necessary to produce the best society
overall, as well as the best use of resources within that society
(as defined by individual wants and preferences).27
There are two primary reasons why autonomy is valued and
thus sought to be maximized. First, autonomy has instrumental
value, or value as a means to achieve other goals. Professor
Ronald Dworkin calls this the “evidentiary view”—that the
28
individual is the best judge of what promotes his own welfare. If
welfare is the ultimate goal, then autonomy serves an
instrumental function in achieving that goal. However, Professor
Dworkin advocates the “integrity view” of autonomy—that
“[a]utonomy encourages and protects people’s general capacity to
lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a
sense of what is important to and for them.”29 In the evidentiary
Id. at 1765–68.
27. Professor Hayek argues this point based on the knowledge differentials between
individuals and the lack of any centralized mechanism that can gather and disseminate
such knowledge. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945); see also 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 55 (1973) (“The thesis of
this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for
their purposes, restrained only by the rules of just conduct of universal application, is
likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims . . . .”).
28. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–23 (1993); see also Winick, supra note 22, at
1770 (“Because individual conceptions of happiness inevitably differ, the individual, and
not the government, must select his or her own path . . . .”).
29. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 224. These two viewpoints demonstrate
consequentialist
versus
deontological
rationales
for
promoting
autonomy.
Consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, determine the ethical or correct course
of action by looking at the consequences of different alternatives. The alternative that
leads to the best result, however defined, is the ethical one. Rule-utilitarianism seeks to
effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest good. Act-utilitarianism, on the
other hand, focuses on individual acts and, in each case evaluates what action will lead to
the greatest good. Deontological theories evaluate the ethics of alternative courses of
action based on the importance of particular values. One basic form of deontological
reasoning is to test the justice of a particular action or practice by universalizing it: if a
practice cannot be sustained when everyone does it, it violates our sense that moral rules
ought to apply equally to all competent moral agents. See IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHY: THE COMPLETE TEXTS OF GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
AND METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE xi–xxii (James W. Wellington trans., 1983).
One of the most famous deontologists is Immanuel Kant, who argued that determining
the moral or right action in a particular circumstance depends on one’s ability to
universalize the rule governing the act, otherwise known as the “categorical imperative.”
Id. at xv–xvi. One formulation of his categorical imperative (sometimes referred to as a
maxim) is to treat people as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Id. at xix. In
other words, we must respect an individual’s capacity to determine what happens to
himself. Id. at xix–xx. One of the major failings of Kantian ethics, and many other
deontological theories, is the lack of guidance for dealing with conflicting maxims.
John Rawls’s adaptation of Kantian ethics attempts to demonstrate how a
deontological theory can be applied to understand the social contract existing in a just
society. He argues that valid ethical principles governing action are those to which
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view, autonomy is valued for its positive consequences.30 In the
integrity view, autonomy is valued in and of itself.31 Both
rationales support maximum respect for autonomy within our
society and thus through our laws and legal system.
II. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WAIVER
If waivers are autonomous actions, then most waivers should
be allowed with little interference from the state.32 A society that
places primary value on autonomy should not interfere with the
individual exercise of autonomy except to the extent that such
exercise infringes upon the autonomy of others. Using John
Stuart Mill’s position as a baseline because he takes a fairly
extreme view of limitations on governmental interference with
individual freedom, we might begin to consider the justifications
for imposing limits on autonomy. As Mill states in his famous
essay On Liberty, “[t]he only part of the conduct of any one, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute.”33 Mill distinguishes the individual realm, in
which societal interference is impermissible, from the public
realm, in which interference may be appropriate, and sometimes
necessary, to assure protection of the individual realm.34 A
government that values autonomy will necessarily be both
limited and justified in its actions by this pronouncement—
limited to the extent that a government must not interfere with a
person’s actions within the private realm and, at the same time,
justified in taking actions that assure that individuals have

rational agents would all agree if situated behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance,” for
example, blind as to individual interests. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 516–18
(1971). In this state, we might agree to a rule, or rules, promoting individual autonomy.
30. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 223 (defining the evidentiary view as respecting
others’ decisions because they know what is best for themselves).
31. See id. at 224 (explaining the integrity view as “recogniz[ing] that people often
make choices that reflect weakness, indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality” and that it
“does not assume that competent people have consistent values or always make consistent
choices”).
32. Depending on the initial theory one subscribes to, the justification for legal
interference will vary. Under an autonomy framework, legal intervention is justified
when the rules will result in a situation of greater autonomy overall.
33. Mill, supra note 21, at 48.
34. Id. at 48–50. There are a number of problems with this dichotomy that have
been well analyzed by others. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM,
supra note 19, at 19–22 (questioning Mill’s objection “to paternalistic interferences with a
person’s liberty”); Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 19, at 3–
17 (arguing that state action can be justified “to protect individuals from self-inflicted
harm”).
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freedom to act within the private realm.35 The latter position
implies that to protect one individual’s autonomy, the autonomy
of another individual will sometimes be subject to state
interference to the extent that the actions in question have
implications beyond the individual sphere.36 This Article will not
address limits on individual autonomous actions that have effects
on other individuals’ autonomy because these actions may be
limited on that basis alone.37
It might appear that, under this framework, waivers within
38
the individual realm should always be given deference. But
even under Mill’s idealized notion of autonomy, this situation is
not so—there are limits on an individual’s liberty to give up
liberty. Thus, Mill states:
[A]n engagement by which a person should sell himself, or
allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and
void . . . . [B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his
liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single
act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of

35. These two aspects of autonomy are sometimes referred to as negative and
positive autonomy. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV.
875, 875–85 (1994) (arguing that this dual conception is flawed, and suggesting an
alternative framework). This Article addresses Professor Fallon’s arguments in more
detail below. Negative autonomy refers to restrictions on governmental action—the right
of individuals to non-interference within an autonomous sphere. Id. at 876, 880–81.
Positive autonomy refers to societal promotion of autonomy—a justifying basis for
governmental intrusion into the individual sphere to promote individual autonomy. Id. at
876, 883–85.
36. Examples of state interference with individual autonomy due to effects on
others are numerous and include: time, place, and manner constraints on freedom of
speech; imposition of obligations with regard to marriage and children; tort law
protections of persons and property; traffic laws; and criminal laws such as assault and
battery.
37. It is, of course, difficult to draw lines between actions that affect only the
individual in question and actions that affect others. All actions affect other individuals in
some way—persons do not function in a vacuum. This fact is the problem (well discussed
by others) with Mill’s notion of actions within the individual realm. But, for purposes of
this argument, this Article will assume we can draw some distinctions between waivers of
rights that pertain specifically to the individual and those that implicate rights of other
persons. Limits on autonomous actions that affect others may be justified on that basis—
the effect on others. For example, in contracts, one party to a contract cannot waive a
condition for the benefit of both parties. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 494 (3d ed. 1987). Of more interest to me (and the focus of this
Article) are limits on individual autonomy with respect to actions that do not obviously (or
directly) affect others.
38. This presumes that the waiver is itself autonomous. Consider the example of
waivers of conflicts of interests for legal professionals. In some situations, courts reject
individual choices because they distrust the motivations of the attorneys, and thus appear
to question whether the individual’s waiver is fully informed and autonomous. Zacharias,
supra note 2, at 416–17, 422.
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himself. . . . The principle of freedom cannot require that he
39
should be free not to be free.

In other words, promotion of autonomy requires that
individuals relinquish the freedom or right to give up
(permanently) autonomy itself. Mill seems to give two unrelated
reasons for this restriction. The first is utilitarian in nature:
slavery is per se harmful or bad, outweighing any harm from
restricting autonomy in these situations. The second is Kantian:
individuals have inherent sovereignty over themselves that
cannot be given up.40 Professor Gerald Dworkin agrees that
limitations on autonomy are permissible and that governmental
restrictions or interference are justified “to preserve a wider
41
range of freedom for the individual in question.” Eschewing
Mill’s arguments, he stresses that it is often rational for
individuals to agree ahead of time to state interference with their
42
liberty, even within the so-called “individual realm.”
39. Mill, supra note 21, at 121; see also Kronman, supra note 14, at 776–80
(suggesting that a person’s inability to enslave himself increases his self control because it
protects the person from engaging in a contract which gives the other party the right of
specific enforcement). Self-enslavement is problematic because an enslaved person does
not have the option to pay damages, but instead, is held to specific performance. Id.
40. Professor Gerald Dworkin, in particular, notes that Mill seems to use two
different justifications for restricting governmental interference with individual liberty.
See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 24–28. The first justification is that interference causes
harm (or that coercive action causes harm). Id. at 26. But this justification is an empirical
question that would need to be answered in each case and creates no more than a
rebuttable presumption against paternalistic action. The second justification is that state
interference is per se wrong, regardless of the balance of harm and benefit. Id. at 27. This
justification is certainly stronger, but cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism.
41. Id. at 27–28.
42. Id. at 29. John Rawls, one of the most prominent consent theorists, suggests
that the state’s power to constrain individual autonomy could be based on a type of social
contract between individuals who determine the governing rules while behind a
hypothetical veil of ignorance, unaware of their individual position or needs. RAWLS,
supra note 29, at 515–17. Under this concept, individuals may consent to paternalistic
interventions “that the parties would acknowledge in the original position to protect
themselves against the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will.” Id. at 249.
Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy). All people wish to maximize
their autonomy but are unable to know their needs and the personal limits that will
restrict them from achieving their individual preferences. Therefore, they will likely
consent to the state’s limits on individual autonomy to the extent that the limits are likely
to promote the greatest autonomy for the most people. Although this notion of consent
provides a theoretical justification for state restrictions on individual freedom, it is
problematic in practice because most people do not actually consent to governmental
interference with their lives, and some people may reject the initial constraints of Rawls’s
original position. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 183 (relating
democratic theorists’ belief that few citizens have ever explicitly consented to obey a
majority decision and that tacit consent to the state should not be assumed). Nonetheless,
it provides the most promising basis for evaluating autonomy claims.
Professor James Fleming develops Rawls’s theory into a practical tool to use in
constitutional decisionmaking and argues that, in determining which rights are entitled

(2)BERGG1.DOC

292

5/28/2003 6:31 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[40:2

Philosopher Joel Feinberg likewise acknowledges that there may
be limitations on autonomy, but for practical reasons—because to
allow such action we must be certain that it was, in fact,
voluntary and because testing voluntariness in all situations
would be cumbersome—we presume nonvoluntariness in cases of
significant waivers of autonomy.43 The three viewpoints represent
the range of rationales for limiting autonomy.
Even if we agree that slavery or other “waivers” of autonomy
within Mill’s individual realm are impermissible, several other
competing grounds exist, including utilitarian calculations that
the harm in giving up autonomy is so great that it outweighs the
44
harm from state interference with individual liberty; Kantian
notions that there is something inherent in persons that cannot
be given up;45 social contract or consent theories that allow
individuals to choose a priori to give up freedom in certain
circumstances;46 and practical concerns about determining
voluntariness.47 Without clear guidance from one or another of
these rationales, it may be impossible to determine the range of
limits on freedom to waive rights and thus, on waivers of
autonomy.48
to significant protection, courts should look at the link between the right and the
deliberative quality of autonomy. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (positing that “[c]onstitutional constructivism limits the scope of
autonomy to protecting basic liberties that are significant preconditions for autonomy”).
That is, only those rights that are crucial for assuring an individual’s ability to function
within a deliberative democracy should be granted the highest protections from
governmental interference. He identifies two aspects of deliberation—“capacity for a sense
of justice” and “capacity for a conception of the good”—and focuses less on privacy and
liberty than on assuring individuals the freedom to associate and interact to develop these
two aspects. Id. at 18, 36.
43. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14.
44. Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy).
45. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13 (remarking that “there is something in every
human being that is not his or hers to alienate or dispose of”). Refer to Part II.A infra
(discussing ascriptive autonomy). See also Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice:
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 399 (1985) (stressing that there are other values at stake
such as human dignity and stating that “[i]t is immoral to participate in such consensual
[but degrading] transactions and immoral for the community to tolerate them”).
46. Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy).
47. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations).
48. Mill’s answer seems to be that waivers of autonomy should not be allowed, but
are sometimes necessary for practical reasons. Mill, supra note 21, at 121 (arguing that
although freedom should not allow a person to alienate his freedom by allowing himself to
be enslaved, the practical “necessities of life” require that people consent to some
limitations of their freedom). Joel Feinberg takes the opposite position, arguing that
waivers of autonomy should be allowed in all cases except when, for practical reasons, it is
too difficult to determine whether the waiver is itself voluntary (autonomous). Feinberg,
supra note 34, at 15–17 (discussing employment contracts and contracts “in restraint” of
trade as examples of agreements to abandon liberty).
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Waivers often involve both a gain in autonomy (from the
exercise of the autonomy through the waiver) and a loss of
autonomy (from having sacrificed the right that is being waived).
Accordingly, a sensible analytical approach is to compare the
gain in autonomy from the act of waiver with the loss of
autonomy when the right is waived and then try to maximize the
overall autonomy. Within this framework this Article proposes
three categories of rights that might be subject to waiver based
49
on two different conceptions of autonomy.
The first two categories of autonomy are referred to as
“ascriptive” and “descriptive” autonomy, respectively, borrowing
from the terminology of Professor Richard Fallon Jr.50 Each has
different implications for the permissibility of state interference
with individual action.51 The third category is termed “system”
52
limitations on waivers of autonomy.
Ascriptive autonomy is an inherent characteristic, a right of
all competent persons. It refers to basic sovereignty over the self
and is limited only by the inherent autonomy (and thus rights) of
53
other people. This notion of autonomy is not quantifiable—
“people to whom autonomy is ascribed are neither more nor less
autonomous than anyone else; all competent adult persons
possess the right to be self-governing to the same degree.”54
55
Under ascriptive autonomy, paternalistic interventions by the
49. Refer to notes 50–60 infra and accompanying text (reviewing Richard Fallon
Jr.’s descriptions of ascriptive and descriptive autonomy).
50. Fallon, supra note 35, at 876–77.
51. See id. at 877–78
52. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations).
53. Fallon, supra note 35, at 890 (observing that “[a]scriptive autonomy entails
sovereignty within a sphere bounded by the requirement of respect for the rights of
others”).
54. Id. at 891.
55. “Paternalistic” refers to those interventions that are done with the individual’s
well-being as the goal. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 3. Paternalistic interventions
contrast with state limitations on individual action that are based on other concerns (for
example, the rights of others or public health and safety).
Paternalism trumps autonomy under a conception of autonomy either
acknowledging that individuals do not function autonomously in all circumstances (weak
paternalism), or that in some cases individuals acting “autonomously” are not really
acting in their own best interests (strong paternalism). BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra
note 19, at 277–78. Weak paternalism is not inconsistent with autonomy because it is
basically designed to facilitate what would have been the individual’s decision had all the
requirements of autonomy been met (for example, if an individual lacks the capacity to
understand the decision at issue, then a choice might be made for him based on an
analysis of what the individual himself would have chosen had he truly understood the
issue at stake). See id. at 277. Arguably, weak paternalism is not really paternalistic
action at all. Id. at 278. On the other hand, strong paternalism is inconsistent with
autonomy. If autonomy is an acknowledgment—both that individuals have inherent
sovereignty over their persons and that the individual is the best judge of what is in her
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state are not permissible, either to promote individual autonomy
or to limit the individual’s ability to give up autonomy.56 Kantian
theory supports this notion by suggesting that individuals have
57
inherent worth and self-sovereignty that cannot be given up.
Under a descriptive conception, by contrast, autonomy
depends on certain capacities and varies among different people
58
in different circumstances. If someone can be said to be more or
less autonomous, paternalistic interventions to promote
59
autonomy may be appropriate. A descriptive theory of autonomy
is compatible with governmental interventions (restrictions)
designed to assure or increase autonomy of individuals.60 A
descriptive theory also allows for limitations on waivers of
autonomy so that autonomy overall may be maximized or,
alternatively, where autonomy is not maximized, by allowing a
waiver (either because the autonomy given up is too great or
because the waiver itself is not truly autonomous). The greater
the autonomy given up,61 the less willing we should be to allow a
waiver without strong assurances that the waiver itself is
autonomous.62 In other words, if the ultimate goal is promotion of
autonomy, then waivers of rights promoting descriptive
autonomy should be allowed only to the extent that the waiver

interests—then there is no room for a strong theory of paternalism, which presupposes
that an external actor can judge what actions would be in an individual’s best interests.
That is to say, absent some incapacity that interferes with autonomy, there is no room
within the notion of autonomy for external determinations of best interests. If the
individual’s decision is truly autonomous, it is de facto in her best interests as she defines
them (and that is the only definition that matters). See id. at 277.
56. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 890–94 (describing ascriptive autonomy as
“hostile” to paternalism).
57. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13.
58. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 877 (observing that descriptive autonomy is a
matter of degree and that those people with self-awareness may be highly autonomous
while others who lack self-restraint may not be autonomous at all).
59. Professor Fallon identifies four elements that comprise descriptive autonomy:
(1) “critical and self-critical ability”; (2) “competence to act”; (3) “sufficient options”; and
(4) “independence of coercion and manipulation.” Id. at 886–89. Some of these elements
are less developed than others. For example, Professor Fallon appears to include both
physical and mental ability under the notion of “competence to act,” without much
discussion of the different implications of each. See id. at 888. Refer to notes 122–26 infra
(analyzing these elements in depth). Suffice it to say for now that I agree with Professor
Fallon’s assertion that autonomy has both descriptive and ascriptive components and that
both of these notions are crucial for understanding waivers.
60. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 877–88 (giving the example that regulating
cigarette advertising that lures people into smoking may promote descriptive autonomy).
61. Another way to think about this is to consider the extent to which the right in
question is linked to autonomy. Refer to note 185 infra (reviewing Mill’s and Professor
Smith’s views on the relationship between autonomy and certain liberties).
62. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing his reasoning regarding proof of
voluntariness).
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itself is autonomous, and the autonomy given up is outweighed
by the autonomy exercised by the waiver decision.
Although a large proportion of individual rights have some
implications for autonomy, not all do. Law in a liberal state is
presumably designed to promote or protect autonomy,63 but each
rule within the system is not necessarily designed to recognize or
to protect individual autonomy. However, once the system is in
place, certain rules are required to assure that the system
64
continues to work as envisioned. This category will be referred
to as “system limitations.”
A. Ascriptive Autonomy
Waivers of rights designed to respect ascriptive autonomy
are the most problematic.65 This is the paradox of autonomous
waivers—to give up autonomy. The state cannot interfere with
individual autonomy under an ascriptive conception, nor can the
66
individual give up the “moral entailments of personhood.”
Rights that implicate ascriptive autonomy can be given up in the
sense that the state may not interfere with the individual’s
67
decision to give up the right. However, the state cannot uphold
a waiver of ascriptive autonomy either.

63. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 177, 183.
The turn from liberty to autonomy reflects a shift from higher law views that
justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific substantive goal,
securing certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state
because it allows for the pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends
that are legitimate.
Id.
64. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations).
65. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (stating that
“[c]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver”). Examples include the
waiver of the right to jury trial, to associate, and waiver of rights granted by the Bill of
Rights. See id.
66. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 890–91 (remarking that under an ascriptive view
of autonomy, “all competent adult persons possess the right to be self-governing”); see also
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (J.W. Gough ed., Macmillan Co.
1956) (1946) (“For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact, or his
own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary
power of another to take away his life when he pleases.”).
67. This has some interesting implications for control over bodily integrity. For
example, the Supreme Court has concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment was so rooted in U.S. history, tradition, and practice as to require special
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990). Because, under an ascriptive theory, the state can neither
disallow nor uphold a waiver of the right to control bodily integrity, the notion of waiver of
informed consent may seem problematic. Refer to Part IV.A infra (discussing waiver of
informed consent).
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In practice, few waivers are barred under ascriptive
68
autonomy. One rare example, however, is the restriction on
selling oneself into slavery. Under an ascriptive notion, the state
cannot intervene and punish someone who decides to sell himself
into slavery, and may not even be able to invalidate the decision
unless the decision infringes other individuals’ autonomy.
Determining what decisions have purely individual repercussions
is the crux of the problem.69 The state cannot step in and restrict
autonomy in ascriptive cases based solely on concerns about the
individual giving up autonomy, but must justify the interference
on some other ground.70 For example, state restrictions on things
such as prostitution71 and illegal migrant workers72 (two
examples often compared with the sales of one’s body or labor
into slavery) are sometimes justified because of their effect on
other people. In the absence of “other-regarding” concerns, the
state can neither restrict nor enforce a contract for slavery if the
individual who initially agreed to the servitude chooses not to
uphold her end of the bargain. Total and permanent control over
one’s self (body) is not something that can be transferred (such a
contract would be voidable at the very least).73 Although contracts
68. Usually ascriptive and descriptive categories overlap. That is, some rights
reflect values related to ascriptive autonomy, but the rules (laws) developed to implement
or protect the underlying rights focus on descriptive autonomy. For example, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination presumably reflects, in part, the societal
value of individual self-sovereignty and thus ascriptive autonomy, but the Miranda
warnings are designed to facilitate individual knowledge of rights and thus exercises of
descriptive autonomy. Many of the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of
Rights fit this categorization. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–IX. Although laws based on an
ascriptive conception of autonomy are rare (if not non-existent), laws based on a
descriptive notion of autonomy are quite prevalent. Included here are legal protections
designed to assure promotion and protection of individual autonomy such as informed
consent, fiduciary obligations, and minimum wage laws. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (disallowing waiver of minimum wage laws).
69. The “other-regarding” issue has the potential to swallow the general rule
because we might be able to define almost anything in terms of its “other-regarding”
effect. One way to address this issue is to require a process for societal agreement
regarding restrictions on autonomy. Refer to note 185 infra (discussing Professor Smith’s
preference for a theoretical process where individuals mutually decide upon the limits of
freedom).
70. For example, Feinberg notes that a ban on slavery can be justified because
weakening respect for human dignity can lead to harm to nonconsenting parties.
Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13. State interests in protecting nonconsenting parties may be
strong enough to justify interference with individual liberty and may even allow for state
action (criminal penalties) against the individual parties involved.
71. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. No. 688 (1901) (outlawing prostitution).
72. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 970 (West 2003) (outlawing misrepresentations
designed to lure migrant workers to another place of work).
73. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227–28, 243–45 (1911) (holding that a
state statute which requires compulsory service to pay a debt constitutes involuntary
servitude and violates the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
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for personal services are not slavery, the analysis may be similar.
In a contract for personal services, the individual retains the
right to refuse to accord the services.74 While monetary damages
are an appropriate remedy in such cases, specific performance is
not.75
The practical effect of ascriptive autonomy is small, and will
generally turn out not to be a limiting factor. In all cases where it
is a limiting factor, there should be some prior indications that
ascriptive autonomy is at issue. Specifically, the cases should be
analogous to the slavery situation, and are likely to be focused on
the sale or other “use” of one’s physical body. For example, the
appropriateness of surrogate gestational motherhood (“womb
donation,” where a woman carries a fetus genetically unrelated
to her and without any intent to rear the child after birth) has
76
raised questions of waiver of ascriptive autonomy. Yet, despite
the limited real-world impact, the ascriptive conception is useful
for explaining why there are some limits on waivers of certain
rights that are essential for autonomy, even when the waiver
itself appears to be completely autonomous and the effect on
other people’s autonomy is insignificant.
B. Descriptive Autonomy
Waivers of rights that promote descriptive autonomy are not
inherently inconsistent. A descriptive theory allows waivers of
autonomy if, and only if, the waiver both promotes autonomy and
promotes more autonomy than is lost by sacrificing the right.
Because the goal is to increase autonomy, governmental
interference with waiver is permissible if the waiver would have
resulted in a decrease in overall autonomy, taking into account
the autonomy entailed in the waiver decision. The challenge is to
balance the degree to which the waiver decision is autonomous
and the degree of autonomy given up because of the waiver. That
74. See Kronman, supra note 14, at 783 (noting that a contracting party who later
regrets his agreement may abandon that agreement and compensate the other party).
75. Id. at 779, 783 (explaining that allowing an employer to compel specific
performance would be inappropriate because it would, in effect, make an employment
contract enslaving). One way to think about this is to say that a contract for personal
services is voidable. It is valid when made, and continues in force until the party obligated
to perform the personal services fails to do so. Equity principles can then be applied to
allow monetary damages to the other party if appropriate, but specific performance of the
contract would not be permitted.
76. See, e.g., David H. Smith, Wombs for Rent, Selves for Sale?, 4 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH. L. & POL’Y 23, 33–34 (1988) (considering the analogy between gestational
surrogacy and contracts for slavery). However, even this may not be a proper example
because womb donors remain free to terminate the pregnancy within the appropriate
legal limitations on abortion, and consequently, the “waivers” are not comprehensive.
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is, if the waiver of a right decreases autonomy, then that loss of
autonomy should be counterbalanced by the increase of
autonomy gained by respecting the waiver decision. For
correspondingly smaller waivers of autonomy, the waiver itself
may be less autonomous.
In some cases the balancing may be done ahead of time, on a
general level.77 For example, Professor Gerald Dworkin points out
that some state paternalistic actions are justified because they
are “the only feasible means of achieving some benefit which is
recognized as such by all concerned.”78 Maximum weekly work
hours79 and even strict liability protections80 fit into this
81
category. These are laws designed to increase overall descriptive
autonomy, but to do so, they restrict individual autonomy in
specific cases by limiting the extent to which individuals can optout of the protection. However, they do so not because individuals
in each case are unable to recognize or judge their own interests
(for example, because the individual lacks autonomy), but rather
because the only way to assure protection of the interests in
question (to which everyone agrees initially) is to make an
across-the-board rule, enforced by the state.82 In other words, the
77. This is based on the concept of a social contract. Professor Gerald Dworkin
argues that this includes “consent to a system of government, run by elected
representatives, with an understanding that they may act to safeguard our interests in
certain limited ways.” Dworkin, supra note 34, at 29.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. (arguing that legislation forbidding employees to work more than forty hours
per week is paternalistic because it is a way for society to impose its own conception of the
employees’ best interests upon them).
80. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(imposing strict liability in tort upon a manufacturer); Linn v. Radio Ctr. Delicatessen,
Inc., 9 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111–12 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939) (holding that a pastry manufacturer
could not disclaim liability for a foreign substance in its food because it would be against
sound public policy). But see Ausness, supra note 2, at 294, 298 (arguing that individuals
should be allowed to waive product liability based on both autonomy and efficiency
claims).
Arguably, waivers in the negligence context are limited because of their “otherregarding” effect. That is, the negligence standard is an efficiency standard, so a waiver of
negligence would allow an inefficient societal result which has implications for other
individuals’ autonomy. See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1605–12 (1997) (discussing Judge Posner’s view that most tort law
rules, including negligence, promote economic efficiency).
81. For example, unemployment compensation and usury laws cannot be waived.
See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 502 P.2d 645,
653–54 (Kan. 1972) (unemployment compensation); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1515, at 731–32 (1962) (usury laws).
82. This is a type of rule-utilitarian argument. Refer to note 29 supra (noting that
“[r]ule-utilitarianism seeks to effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest
good”). The best state of affairs (the maximization of autonomy) occurs if a general rule is
applied across the board. The “agreement” here is a priori. That is, theoretically,
individuals would agree ahead of time, not knowing their individual circumstances at the
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interest identified at the outset is in having a maximum work
hours standard that applies to all situations. If individuals are
allowed to opt-out, then the protection would not function.83
Individual exceptions are not allowed because they would either
undermine the general rule (thus implicating other people’s
autonomy)84 or because of the belief that some individuals could
never make a truly autonomous decision to waive the protection
due to the power inequities of the relationship. Autonomy may
always be absent from relationships with significant power
85
differentials;
furthermore, measuring autonomy in these
situations would be so difficult it may be practically impossible or
unduly burdensome.86
Therefore, waivers of rights designed to promote descriptive
autonomy may be restricted on a number of bases. Society
(individuals collectively) may determine that the balance of
autonomy overall generally favors protection87 because (1)
allowing individual waivers would undermine the autonomy of
others; (2) individual waivers could never be autonomous; or (3)
the burden of proving that the waiver meets the requisite level of
autonomy in each case may be too costly.88 Alternatively, in a
time of a later potential waiver, that waivers should not be allowed.
83. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 772 (using nondisclaimable warranties of
habitability as an example of an instrument of redistribution that is nonwaivable because
if it were allowed to be waived, poor tenants would “routinely be required to waive their
rights to habitable premises, thereby restoring whatever distributional inequities exist at
the outset”).
84. Rights conferred upon a private party but affecting the public interest cannot be
waived, as such waiver “would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to
effectuate.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
85. Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 755, 759, 760 (1978) (discussing inequities in bargaining
power).
86. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14 (arguing that testing voluntariness is expensive
and fallible).
87. This is akin to Mill’s utilitarian argument for restricting slavery. Refer to note
40 supra and accompanying text (explaining that Mill’s argument for restricting slavery
suggests that slavery is per se harmful, thus outweighing any harm that occurs from
restricting autonomy). See also Richard Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human
Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 499–500 (1996)
(arguing that the U.S. Constitution itself is an example of this “self-paternalism” because
“the framers knew the dangers of policy based on emergency and expediency, and the
occasional attractiveness of utility-based or even bigotry-based action, it made sense to
prospectively limit what government could do to us and what we could do to each other
and ourselves”).
88. This is akin to Feinberg’s argument in the slavery context. Refer to note 48
supra and accompanying text (acknowledging the need for limitations on autonomy
because of practical concerns). See also Kronman, supra note 14, at 768–69 (suggesting
that a rationale for restricting waivers of certain contractual entitlements may be based
on the concern that “if most of the waivers that are given are procured through fraud, and
if the fraud can rarely be proven, the inefficiencies of a nonwaiver rule may be outweighed
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particular situation the autonomy given up by waiver may
outweigh the autonomy of the individual’s decision to waive;
however, this determination must be made on a case-by-case
basis. Part III examines waivers of descriptive autonomy in more
detail.
C. System Limitations
Many rights cannot be waived, not because of the link
between the right and autonomy, but because of the implications
of waiver for the system as a whole.89 For example, at trial,
criminal defendants cannot waive the right to have guilt proven
90
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor can they waive the subject
matter jurisdiction of a court.91 These are examples of procedural
protections designed to assure that our criminal justice system
92
functions in a particular way. There is nothing in and of itself
valuable, from an autonomy standpoint, about limiting the issues
that different courts can adjudicate. In other words, the subject
matter jurisdiction of a court is not a right that is designed
specifically to promote individual autonomy. Moreover, we can
envision a truly autonomous (and rational) decision by an

by the greater inefficiency of enforcing too many fraudulent bargains”). Kronman also
notes that information asymmetries often create this situation. Id. at 770.
89. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 87, at 496 (arguing that “we often balance our
general preference for unfettered respect for consensual arrangements against other
concerns . . . aim[ed] at increasing systemic efficiency”).
90. This is true in cases where the defendant does not enter a guilty plea. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal charge is constitutionally mandated).
91. King, supra note 2, at 133 (“[S]ome deals—an agreement to circumvent subject
matter jurisdiction or an agreement to be sentenced by orangutans . . . [are
unenforceable] . . . because of the harm such agreements cause to an interest or value
independent of the preferences of the defendant and prosecution.” (footnote omitted)).
Professor King stresses, however, that the category of subject matter jurisdiction
encompasses a number of issues and may not serve a useful purpose for identifying
unwaivable errors. Id. at 145–47; see also Zacharias, supra note 2, at 420 (discussing
system issues with respect to waivers of conflicts of interest).
Society may also desire unconflicted representation as a means to further the
pursuit of truth, or, at least, of appropriate results within the adversary
system . . . . [It] has a right to insist that, when the adversary system is invoked,
the processes work in accordance with the system’s premises.
Id.
92. We might say that these rights are necessary to ensure system integrity
(reliability) and thus required to maintain support for the system in a liberal society.
Alternatively, it may be possible to argue that these are really issues of waivers of rights
that have implications for other individuals. But it is hard to see how this is so, except
that waivers in this context would undermine the system as a whole and thus affect other
people. The concern in the latter situation is with indirect effects. So someone analyzing
these process rights under a “harm to others” theory may come to the same conclusion I
do in limiting waivers.
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individual to waive a jurisdictional bar, and such a decision
would not implicate the individual’s inherent right of selfsovereignty or interfere with protections put in place to assure
autonomous decisions and actions. But this and other rules
promote the type of criminal justice system our society has
chosen. Allowing individual waivers of these kinds of rights93
would undermine the system, and ultimately undermine the goal
sought to be achieved by putting the original process or
protection in place—to assure a system that guarantees the
greatest protections for each individual’s autonomy.
Limitations on waivers that do not directly implicate
autonomy may appear difficult to reconcile with the theory
described here. It is possible, however, to conceive of these rights,
and the restrictions on their waiver, as ones that individuals
would agree to in advance; individuals may do so either
specifically, or more likely, by agreeing to be governed by
representatives who then put forward the specific procedural
94
rules. If we accept this social contract explanation, limitations
on waiver of such rights are compatible with an autonomy
theory. Consider the difference between what cognitive
behavioral psychologist Jean Piaget refers to as “constitutive”
and “constituted” rules.95 The former are the rules required for
the system to function—they are necessary preconditions for
96
creating any rules in the first place. The latter are rules created
under the system of constitutive rules.97 For example, Rawls’s
hypothetical construct of a “veil of ignorance” is a type of
constitutive rule—that is, all (constituted) rules in a just society
should be created under a fair situation where individuals are
93. The term “procedural right” does not mean a less important right. Thus, one
might talk about fundamental procedural rights, such as the right to jury trial. See, e.g.,
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (stating that courts will “indulge
every reasonable presumption” that the right to a jury trial has not been waived).
94. See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 29 (drawing a distinction between specifically
requesting enforcement of a measure and electing a government to make that decision on
the public’s behalf).
95. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 92–93 (1932).
96. See Arthur J. Dyck & Herbert W. Richardson, The Moral Justification for
Research Using Human Subjects, Use of Human Subjects, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE
LAW 245–46 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1976) (describing a social
system’s need for both benefits and structural values that secure those benefits); Hans
Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting on Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219,
228 (1969) (“Society . . . cannot ‘afford’ a single miscarriage of justice, a single inequity in
the dispensation of its laws, the violation of the rights of even the tiniest minority,
because these undermine the moral basis on which society’s existence rests.”).
97. See Dyck & Richardson, supra note 96, at 244–45 (explaining that rules that
prevent harm to individuals can be waived if the potential benefit outweighs the risk of
harm, but violations of structural values cannot be tolerated because such violations could
compromise the social systems from which all benefits are derived).
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unaware of their particular situation and needs, making them
free to be “objective.”98 To the extent that a right implicates a
constitutive rule, individuals may not waive it because its
absence would undermine our ability to create any other
governing rules and to enforce our pre-existing constituted
rules.99 Of course, as with difficulties in drawing lines between
individual actions and other actions, it is not always clear which
rules may be deemed constitutive and which are constituted.
Alternatively, we might justify system limitations on
individual autonomy because the waivers in question affect other
people. Allowing an individual to be found guilty (in the absence
of a plea of guilty) without the requisite level of proof, even if the
individual waives the burden of proof, makes it more likely that
the determination of guilt is erroneous. A society that wrongfully
labels and punishes innocent people may diminish the autonomy
of both the innocent person in question as well as people
generally who feel they cannot act freely for fear of wrongful
prosecution and punishment. Or, to tie in with Piaget’s
framework, undermining constitutive rules will lead to a
breakdown of society (because other rules cannot be formed or
enforced in their absence), thus harming other people. In either
event, both arguments serve to justify limitations on individual
100
autonomous waivers of pure process rights.
Alternatively, system limitations may be necessary not
because the rule in question functions as a constitutive rule
(required for the formation of the system in the first place), but
because at this point, given the currently functioning system,
changing the rules may result in unintended problems.101 That is
to say, because each individual functioning within the system
will be unable to know all the effects of a change, and because
society is a complex system, any small change in one part of the
102
system will have implications for numerous other parts. As a

98. Refer to note 29 supra (discussing Rawls’s adaptation of Kantian ethics).
99. See Dyck & Richardson, supra note 96, at 245–46.
100. Many rights have both procedural and substantive components. For example,
the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are
generally procedural in nature, but ultimately are designed to protect individual privacy,
an inherent part of autonomy. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at
190 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of “right to privacy” in Fourth
Amendment cases); Spritzer, supra note 2, at 478–79 (disagreeing with the Court’s
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that the Fourth Amendment does not have
anything to do with “promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial”).
101. See 1 HAYEK, supra note 27, at 60 (explaining that an ordered society is the
result of evolution constrained by certain guiding principles rather than an arrangement
of discrete elements).
102. Id. This is also the basis of “chaos theory” (also termed “complexity theory”).
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result, there may be limits on individual waivers of rights that
are designed merely to structure the system in a particular
way.103
Moreover, some rights are considered to be waived if they
are not asserted at the appropriate time. The rights in question
may be either process protections or descriptive autonomy
protections that otherwise could be waived. Failure to act within
a specific timeframe results in what might be called constructive
waiver, and is sometimes referred to as forfeiture, procedural
default, or laches.104 Timeframe limits are necessary to assure
that the system functions. In addition, other people may rely on
the waiver, and thus the time limitations function to protect their
interests. Arguably this category does not entail true waivers
because there are no autonomous decisions about each right
given up. A number of experts in criminal procedure have sought
to restrict the definition of waiver in such a way. For example,
Professor George Dix argues that waivers include only a
defendant’s “conscious willingness to forgo exercise of a right.”105
Professor Ralph Spritzer distinguishes between waivers and
procedural default,106 and Professor Peter Westen stresses the
107
difference between waiver and forfeiture. Such definitional
limitations of the notion of waiver make sense. However, even if
included, restrictions on such waivers can be justified because of
the reliance of (effects on) others and the need for finality in the
system of laws.
Although there remains much to be said regarding system
limitations, such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,
103. Id. at 61.
The preservation of a free system is so difficult precisely because it requires a
constant rejection of measures which appear to be required to secure particular
results, on no stronger grounds than that they conflict with a general rule, and
frequently without our knowing what will be the costs of not observing the rule
in the particular instance.
Id.
104. Laches is the lapse of a right due to a failure to assert it. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 874 (7th ed. 1999). The two elements are: (1) “the plaintiff unreasonably and
inexcusably delayed” in bringing his claim, and (2) the delay materially prejudiced the
defendant. Laura M. Burson, Comment, A.C. Auckerman and the Federal Circuit: What Is
the Standard of Review for a Summary Judgment Ruling on Laches or Equitable
Estoppel?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 799, 804 (1999).
105. Dix, supra note 2, at 196.
106. Spritzer, supra note 2, at 474–75 (defining procedural default as “the loss of a
right through a failure by the accused or his representative to assert the claim in a
prescribed manner or at a required time”).
107. Westen, supra note 2, at 1214, 1238 (noting that forfeiture can occur without an
individual “ever having made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish” the right in
question and concluding that forfeitures are justified by the overriding interests of the
state, not the consent of the defendant as is the case in waivers).
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which is designed to focus primarily on autonomy rights and
waivers within the individual realm. But even so, we must
acknowledge the existence of system limitations on individual
autonomy, even in a society that seeks to promote individual
freedom over all else. The rationales justifying such limitations
include: (1) the necessity of the rule for the system to function
initially; (2) the potential effects on others (including reliance);
and (3) the unintentional effects of interfering with a currently
functioning and evolved system.
D. Summary
This section has identified three categories of “rights” one
may seek to waive: ascriptive, descriptive, and systems. It is
worth pausing for a moment to consider how this framework
might be applied. The issue is whether the state should enforce
or recognize an individual’s waiver of a particular right. A
determination that a waiver is not permissible is not, in itself,
grounds for criminal or civil penalties against the person waiving
the right.108 An impermissible waiver would simply not be
recognized or enforced, or perhaps be voidable by the individual
109
who waives the right in the first place. Where both parties are
satisfied with the result(s) of the waiver, no state interference is
warranted. Only where one party—presumably the one who
waived the right in question, but possibly another party affected
by the waiver—challenges the ultimate outcome must the state
decide whether to enforce the waiver (let the result stand) or to
negate the waiver (which may involve either a determination
that the waiver was invalid in the first place, or voidable). Unlike
an invalid waiver, a voidable waiver would be considered valid at
the time of inception, but could be voided by the individual who

108. Saying that an action lacks autonomy and need not be respected on that ground
does not mean that we, as a society, may not continue to allow the action, or even hold the
individual responsible for the consequences of the action. But these determinations must
be made on different grounds than autonomy. Actions that are non-autonomous, such as
yawning or sneezing or sleepwalking, are not in and of themselves bad or even
problematic. But consider the example of a sleepwalker who wanders out of the house and
destroys a neighbor’s property. Despite the fact that the sleepwalker’s actions were not
autonomous (in the sense of not being intentional), we may still hold the sleepwalker
responsible for paying for the damage. The theory of responsibility is not based on the fact
that the sleepwalker could have controlled his actions, but that he should have taken
steps to prevent the occurrence (perhaps by installing a door alarm that would awaken
him when he attempts to exit the house). Alternatively, we hold the sleepwalker
accountable because we believe it to be fairer in this instance to have him pay for the
damage than the neighbor, even though neither is morally at fault.
109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979) (stating that a
contract is voidable if the assent to the contract is induced by duress).
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waived the right in question.110 The difference may have
implications both for who can challenge the waiver and the
results of the challenge.
Because the starting presumption is that waivers should be
allowed, the best way to apply the framework identified above is
to begin with a consideration of the reasons for limiting waivers.
In general, when faced with a question of whether a waiver
should be upheld, a court111 should first consider whether the
right in question raises issues of autonomy. If not, the court must
determine whether there are system reasons for limiting the
waiver. Many of these reasons have already been identified and
courts can draw from pre-existing law (for example, the legal
doctrines of laches in contract and forfeiture in criminal
procedure).112 Issues of first impression should be determined by
analyzing the extent to which the waiver in question either
addresses a constitutive rule—that is, a rule that is important for
the functioning of the system as a whole—or raises concerns
about the unintended consequences of allowing alterations in an
established rule. In effect, this is a balancing test involving the
individual’s right to autonomous waiver and societal interests in
system constraints.113 If the balance favors societal interests (the
burden should be fairly high), the waiver may be disallowed.
Where the right sought to be waived involves autonomy, a
court should consider whether the waiver should be restricted
because of the implications for ascriptive autonomy. As noted
previously, such cases should be extremely rare. If we take
slavery as our paradigm example, other waivers should be
limited only to the extent that they are strongly analogous to the
slavery situation. At issue, usually, will be the use of an
individual’s physical body, such as in the case of contracts for
personal services. Finally, if there are neither system nor
ascriptive autonomy reasons for limiting a waiver, a court should
consider the issue of descriptive autonomy.

110. For example, waivers involved in contracts for personal services are voidable.
Refer to Part II.A supra.
111. Courts will generally be the bodies adjudicating waivers. But it is also possible
for a legislature to make a priori determinations regarding the permissibility of waivers,
and it should take into account the same factors when choosing to exercise this power.
112. The system of contracts could not function if there was not a time bar to
challenges. Likewise, the criminal system could not function if every conviction were open
to re-examination indefinitely. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1256 (arguing that the issue
with forfeiture in the criminal context is the state reliance on the finality of convictions).
113. See, e.g., id. at 1258 (proposing that a defendant’s freedom of choice, alone, is
not sufficient to justify the waiver of constitutional defenses).
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III. ELEMENTS OF A VALID WAIVER
The above framework provides two initial bases for
determining when waivers should be limited—some because of
system constraints, and others because they interfere with
ascriptive autonomy. The final task is to develop in more detail
limitations on waivers of descriptive autonomy. Most disputed
waivers fall into this category.114 The issue in these cases is
whether society ought to respect an individual’s decision as
autonomous.115 In general, we assume that individuals who have
certain capacities make autonomous decisions—we do not
scrutinize every decision made. Only where the risks of the
decision are particularly weighty do we attach additional
safeguards to assure autonomy. This results in different
standards for evaluating different types of waivers and different
safeguards around the waiver process. The following sections
first evaluate each element of a valid waiver and then consider
the safeguards that have been applied to ensure its presence.
There are few discussions regarding the standards for a socalled “valid” waiver (one that demonstrates the necessary and
sufficient level of autonomy). In criminal procedure, most references
116
which speaks of “an
are to the case of Johnson v. Zerbst,
intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.”117 Contract law
standards for valid waiver include disclosure, bargaining, and
118
voluntariness.
Despite the slightly different terminology, the
elements are all aimed at the same underlying requirements and
draw from the concept of autonomy.119 Two conditions are needed for
autonomous action: voluntariness (freedom from controlling

114. Refer to note 68 supra (describing the overlap of ascriptive and descriptive
autonomy). Even when the underlying values or rights are fundamentally ascriptive, the
rules protecting these rights focus on descriptive autonomy. Id.
115. The primary question is whether the waiver results in an overall increase in
autonomy. Refer to Part II.B supra.
116. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
117. Id. at 464.
118. See generally Rubin, supra note 15, at 513–14 (summarizing the contract law
requirements).
119. This is where I part most significantly from Rubin’s analysis. Rubin argues that
the analysis of voluntariness is too vague to permit useful application to evaluations of
waivers and prefers, instead, the implementation of his functional equivalence standard.
Id. at 492–93. I argue, on the other hand, that except for system concerns, the only basis
for limiting waivers is autonomy, and thus the validity of a waiver must be judged against
autonomy standards. The “confusion” he sees with the interchangeability of the terms
“voluntariness” and “intention” stems not from an inherent problem with the terms, but
with the failure to identify from where the standards come—the concept of autonomy.
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interference) and intention to act (which includes knowledge and
capacity).120
Courts often use varying terminology. For example, the
121
Court in Johnson lists knowledge separately from intention.
Likewise, the contractual requirement of bargaining is a way to
test voluntariness, and the disclosure requirement is designed to
facilitate knowledge. Similarly, Professor Fallon identifies four
factors that comprise his category of “descriptive” autonomy: (1)
critical and self-critical ability; (2) competence to act; (3)
sufficient options; and (4) independence from coercion and
manipulation.122 Critical ability and competence are individual
123
capacities necessary for intention. Independence from coercion
is an aspect of voluntariness.124 The requirement of sufficient
options125 speaks in part to the voluntariness requirement, and in
part to the intention requirement. But not all limitations of
options necessarily limit autonomy—there will be situations in
which individuals may feel they have no choice, but the decisions
in those cases should not be deemed involuntary and thus
lacking autonomy.126

120. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1752 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (describing involuntary actions as those stemming from
compulsion). Aristotle claims that knowledge is also a requirement for voluntariness. Id.
at 1753 (“Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is non-voluntary . . . .”); see also
RALPH MCINERNY, AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION: A THEORY OF PRACTICE 14–20 (1992)
(discussing Aquinas’s views on voluntariness, knowledge, and intention). Although both
Aristotle and Aquinas use the terms nonvoluntary and involuntary to refer to actions that
stem from a lack of knowledge, I characterize knowledge as a requirement for intention
and restrict “voluntariness” to the absence of controlling influences. See BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 19, at 121 (“Virtually all theories of autonomy agree that two
conditions are essential: (1) liberty (independence from controlling influences) and (2)
agency (capacity for intentional action. However, disagreement exists over the meaning of
these two conditions . . . .”); see also Neil Scheurich, MORAL ATTITUDES AND MENTAL
DISORDERS, 32 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 15–16 (free will means “that a
process of deliberation has its own internal momentum and agency and is guided by the
individual in question”).
121. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (emphasis added)).
122. Fallon, supra note 35, at 886–89.
123. Refer to Part III.B infra.
124. Refer to Part III.A infra.
125. For a discussion of the role of options in autonomy, see MAY, supra note 19, at
36–37, 71–73.
126. Refer to Part IV.A infra (advocating waiver of informed consent in medical
contexts where the autonomy given up is balanced against the autonomy of the waiver
itself).
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A. Voluntariness: Freedom from Coercion
There are very few legal definitions of voluntariness, and even
127
the ethical dimensions of the concept remain unclear. Although
the exact contours may not be established, it is often stated that
actions that occur as the result of coercion are not voluntary.128
For example, wills are voided if the testator was subjected to
129
130
undue influence, criminal confessions are voided if coerced, and
contracts entered into under duress are voidable.131 In Schneckloth
132
v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court stated that a waiver is not
valid if “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or
covert force.”133 But the definition of coercion has never been clearly
134
established—only what counts as coercion in particular cases.
135
136
but rare in practice.
More
Actual force is clear-cut,
complicated are the other pressures on individuals that may
127. Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, uses an extremely broad definition of
voluntary: “Done by design or intention . . . . Unconstrained by interference; not impelled by
outside influence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999).
128. Dix, supra note 2, at 243 (“‘[I]t may prove impossible for courts to determine whether
a surrender of rights is truly “voluntary.” . . . But we can ensure that decisions are not coerced
by pressures which the criminal process itself creates or which result from discriminations
within the reach of established constitutional protections.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term—Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights:
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1970))); Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 109–10 (1996) (noting that consent
in contracts can be either voluntary or coerced—implying that coerced agreements are the
opposite of voluntary ones).
129. 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.3, at
718–20 (1960).
130. Colorado v. Connelly, 497 U.S. 157, 166–167 (1986).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979). There are differing notions of
what counts as “coercion” under contract law. See Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of a RightsBased Approach to Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629, 633 (1995).
132. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
133. Id. at 228 (discussing Fourth Amendment waivers).
134. Individual perception appears to play a significant role in determining what
constitutes coercion. See John Monahan et al., Coercion to Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results
and Implications for Assertive Treatment in the Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE
COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 3, 23 (Deborah L. Dennis
& John Monahan eds., 1996). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stressed that voluntariness
in the criminal context is “defined not by a defendant’s subjective perception, but by public
policy concerns.” Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 953–54.
135. In fact, the legal concept of voluntariness first appeared in Roman canon law and the
German Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532. Laurence A.
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical
Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 93 (1988). Both focused on the unreliability of a tortured
confession (a common practice at the time). Id. at 93–94. Likewise, contract law generally
defines duress as physical force. See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of
the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 511 (2001).
136. E. Allan Farnsworth, Coercion in Contract Law, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329,
330 (1982) (stating that “cases of duress by physical compulsion are rare”). Professor
Farnsworth also notes that cases of duress by threat of physical harm are also rare. Id.
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compromise their freedom. Human interaction is never free of
pressures. Many pressures are inherent and constitute a normal
and often desirable part of relationships. Such pressures are often
intended to, and do in fact, influence the person to whom they are
directed. Establishing which pressures affect behavior so extremely
as to deprive it of some legal consequences it might otherwise have
may be difficult. The philosopher Alan Wertheimer notes that
inducements, persuasion, and authority are all forms of pressure
that may be coercive in certain circumstances.137 He distinguishes
between a threat that is coercive and an offer that is not—a
proposal that makes a person worse off (judged against the relevant
baseline) is a threat, whereas one that does not is an offer.138 The
classic proposal of “your money or your life” is a threat because the
individual’s baseline immediately prior included both money and
life, and the choice limits the person’s options. Others have
attempted to define influences along a spectrum ranging from
persuasion, to inducements, to threats, to force.139
Although it may be impossible to establish definitively the
range of actions that may be considered voluntary, we can pinpoint
which pressures should be considered improper such that the
resulting waiver will not be deemed valid. It is important to
recognize that the legal discussion of voluntariness focuses on
140
pressures and threats imposed by others. Thus, internal pressures
(such as those imposed by illness), or even imagined outside
137.
Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophical Examination of Coercion for Mental
Health Issues, 11 BEHAV . SCI . & L. 239, 246–48 (1993).
138. Id. at 244; see also Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 331 (distinguishing a threat
from a promise and stating that the former “manifests an intention to do or not do
something that is less desirable from the promisee’s point of view than if the alternative
were the case”). Similarly, Professor Zaibert notes that an action “is voluntary if and only
if at the time it takes place there exists another option open to the agent . . . . Conversely,
[a] movement is involuntary if and only if at the time it takes place there exists no other
option open to the agent.” L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A
Historical-Philosophical Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 459, 490 (1998).
139. See, e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 256–62 (1986) (establishing a continuum of influences ranging from
coercion, which is completely controlling, to persuasion, which is completely noncontrolling); John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 129, 130–32 (1991); Monahan et
al., supra note 134, at 17–18 (studying the various levels of pressures that may influence
a person’s decisionmaking process when considering hospitalization).
140. See Benner, supra note 135, at 128, 139–42 (stating that the trustworthiness of
confessions is no longer the focus of the criminal law requirements of voluntariness;
rather, the term is defined in terms of police conduct); Joseph A. Lavigne, A
Misapplication of the Exclusionary Rule to Voluntary Confessions: The Fallacy that
Knowingly and Intelligently Made Statements Are Constitutional Prerequisites to
Admissibility, 1999 MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 677, 680–81 (noting that criminal confessions
may be voluntary even if coerced as long as the coercion was not the result of government
(police) action).
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pressures may not invalidate a waiver. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a confession is not involuntary when the
defendant disclosed information to law enforcement authorities
after being directed to do so by voices in his head.141 Thus, the
concern is not necessarily that a waiver was freely given in some
psychological or philosophical sense of the term, but that it is not
142
the result of improper pressures.
Respect for autonomy presupposes that the individual in
question will determine which pressures to take into account in
making decisions. An external observer can decide whether
certain pressures are improper from a societal standpoint, but
not whether the individual should incorporate them into her
143
Which pressures are considered
decisionmaking process.
“improper” depend on an evaluation of the role of the parties

141. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170–71 (1986) (explaining that the
“Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to
confess emanating from sources other than official coercion” (quotation marks omitted)).
142. See Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 947–48 (stating that a confession may
have been coerced if the result of “threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises”); see
also Rick Bigwood, Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 201, 206 (1996) (stating that “the emphasis of legally cognizable coercion—
duress—appears today to have less to do with questions of ‘freedom’ or ‘voluntariness’
than with questions of propriety: ‘wrongness’ or ‘unfairness’”).
143. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 1752 (stating that “with regard to the things
that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object . . . , it may be debated
whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary”). Aristotle suggests that some actions
will be considered voluntary because they are “worthy of choice at the time when they are
done,” but nonetheless may be considered in the abstract involuntary “for no one would
choose any such act in itself.” Id. at 1752–53. He uses the examples of throwing goods
overboard during a storm at sea to protect a crew’s safety. Id. at 1752. Contrast this with
Kant’s view that any external influences undermine autonomy. See MAY, supra note 19,
at 48–51 (comparing Aristotle and Kant on this point).
For example, in the context of human experimentation, there is a great deal of
disagreement about whether and how much financial compensation should be offered in
recruiting subjects because of the concern regarding the coercive effect on the decision to
participate. See, e.g., Christine Grady, Money for Research Participation: Does It
Jeopardize Informed Consent?, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 40–69 (2001) (including peer
commentaries debating the issue of financial compensation for human experimentation).
Determining that compensation should not be offered (or that it is excessive) is a
reflection of what pressures we (society) feel are appropriate in this context. Id. at 42. It is
quite another thing to state that subjects should not be choosing to participate in clinical
trials based on financial considerations—a paternalistic imposition on individual liberty
to decide whether to be involved in a research protocol. Id. The latter replaces the
subject’s right to autonomous decisionmaking (and thus consideration of whatever factors
he or she thinks are appropriate) with a societal determination. Id. Consider Justice
Brandeis’s famous quote regarding the dangers of paternalism: “Experience should teach
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty . . . .
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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involved.144 Moreover, it is important to recognize that
voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing determination; there are
degrees of voluntariness.145 Therefore, the legal issue is whether
the action in question lacks voluntariness to the degree that it
should be considered involuntary and thus the resulting waiver
labeled “invalid.” Voluntariness, in this sense, is “best viewed as
a social construct rather than as discoverable metaphysical
reality.”146
From a legal standpoint then, the voluntariness of a waiver,
or the focus of an inquiry related to voluntariness, depends on
the context. In the criminal context the focus is on improper
147
governmental (police) action. In the contract setting, on the
other hand, the concern is with an improper threat from a
private party.148 Included are threats of physical harm and illegal
149
or unlawful action. In addition, some threats of legal action
have also been held to be improper if they are considered by the
evaluating court to be unfair.150 Identifying which pressures a
court or legislature will determine to be unfair is beyond the
144. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 131, at 651 (arguing that determining whether a
contract should be invalidated because of “coercion” rests on an analysis of the
substantive rights of the parties involved). In other words, determining what counts as an
improper pressure depends on the rights of the respective parties to make decisions in the
absence of certain pressures. According to Provost, the standard in contract law is fairly
vague, but encompasses the notion that a party to a contract has the “right to receive the
property of whoever chooses to contract with him . . . and a right to receive that property
under conditions that are favorable enough to him.” Id. at 660.
145. See, e.g., Scheurich, supra note 120, at 16 (stating that free will is never
absolute, but exists by degrees); Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on “Voluntary” Versus
“Involuntary” Risks, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 176 (1997) (“[T]he question
whether a risk is run voluntarily or not is often not a categorical one but instead a
question of degree . . . . Of course there are interesting background questions about why
and when a risk ‘codes’ as voluntary or involuntary . . . .”).
146. Scheurich, supra note 120, at 16; see also Bigwood, supra note 142, at 228
(explaining that “coercion” is a broader concept than “duress,” and the latter focuses on a
normative baseline determination of the condition the individual ought to be in, rather
than a purely descriptive baseline resting on the individual’s actual circumstances).
147. Refer to notes 151–53 infra and accompanying text (exploring problems with
police coercion).
148. See Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 331 (noting that the Second Restatement of
Contracts implies that one aspect of determining duress is whether the threat . . . is “of a
kind that the law condemns”). But see Snyder, supra note 8, at 677 (suggesting that the
courts distinguish duress from coercion and apply a two-prong test for the latter
requiring: “(1) . . . a threat to deprive the victim of a legal right, and (2) the victim must
act reasonably”).
149. See Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 333–34 (noting that the “first cases to
recognize claims of duress involved threats of physical harm” and later cases recognized
“wrongful” or “unlawful” threats).
150. Id. at 335 (“‘A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms,
and . . . the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit
the party making the threat . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1981))).
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scope of this Article. Some initial constraints have already been
indicated, but a full exploration of what pressures should be
labeled coercive in what circumstances remains to be done.
Interestingly, there seem to be few instances where a priori
safeguards are put in place to assure voluntariness of waivers.151
The reason may be, in part, because of the difficulty in designing
front-end safeguards against coercion, rather than back-end
penalties that (hopefully) serve to prevent improper behavior.152
Because of this difficulty, the remedy in cases of coercion (or
involuntary waiver) is to allow the party who waived the right in
question to void his action. Thus, the result is usually to return
the parties to their initial position, rather than punish the
perpetrator of the improper pressure.153
The bottom line is that the voluntariness aspect of a valid
waiver needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis, usually
after the waiver has been executed. There may be some
circumstances so egregious that we can predict, ahead of time,
that a court would find the actions in question constitute coercion
per se, and thus the resulting waiver would be invalid. Threats of
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a possible example of an a priori
safeguard against coercion, or at least the courts have interpreted it that way. See, e.g.,
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (stating that Miranda “protects defendants
against government coercion”). However, this Article argues below that Miranda is more
about assuring knowledge, which is part of intention, than assuring voluntariness
(protecting against coercion).
There are a number of cases where courts have questioned voluntariness after
the fact. For example, there have been inquiries in the criminal context regarding the
circumstances of a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396,
401–02 (1978) (discussing a case in which the defendant was wounded and under arrest in
an intensive care unit, and despite his request for a lawyer and his protests that he could
not think clearly due to pain, the police questioned him for four hours); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1962) (reviewing a case where a fourteen-year-old boy was
held for five days without access to his parents or a lawyer); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 205–08 (1960) (recognizing that “coercion can be mental as well as physical”
when the defendant was insane, denied access to friends, relatives, and legal counsel, and
the deputy sheriff composed the confession); United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256
F.2d 7, 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1958) (describing that the defendant was physically assaulted and
deprived of food and sleep for almost twenty-four hours).
152. In effect, the exclusion of Fifth Amendment coerced confessions may function to
dissuade police from improper action. See Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 1005
(1995) (arguing that the primary rationale for excluding coerced confessions is to
discourage improper police methods). But this is a not the same as a safeguard put in
place to prevent coercion from occurring in particular cases. An example of such a
safeguard might be a requirement that all interactions with suspects or defendants be
videotaped (on the assumption that this would restrict unwanted behavior).
153. This is not true in all situations. For example, although not common, police
officers can be prosecuted for extreme behavior in coercing a confession under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 193
F.2d 294, 294–97 (5th Cir. 1951) (illustrating the prosecution of a police officer for beating
a suspect to extort a confession).
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physical force fall into this category. Likewise, there may be some
situations that evince such a large disparity of bargaining power,
and thus improper pressures, that we make a societal
determination not to allow waivers in these contexts,154 or
perhaps require up-front assurances that the waivers are made
freely. For example, consider whether a client can waive her
155
attorney’s conflict of interest.
In some jurisdictions such
waivers are not allowed because of concerns that the lawyer has
financial incentives to encourage the waiver and the power156 to
convince her client to agree—basically an across-the-board
descriptive autonomy limitation on waivers.157 Other jurisdictions
allow the waivers, but provide a safeguard by requiring that the
158
lawyer “think in terms of the conflict rules.” For the most part,
however, determination of improper or unfair pressures will
occur after the fact and depend on societal standards governing
159
at the time of the waiver. Waivers of descriptive autonomy
should generally be presumed voluntary, absent a challenge by a
party claiming that the waiver was obtained through coercion.

154. See Anderson, supra note 85, at 755–56 (stating that “[w]here the relative
bargaining power of the parties is unequal, the extent of non-waivable duties implied by
law will be much greater”).
155. Limitations on client waivers of a lawyer’s conflicts of interest are often based
on system concerns with assuring a fair and appropriate adversarial process (and thus
limiting a client’s ability to choose a lawyer whose independent judgment is
compromised). See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 2, at 420 (asserting that, although a client
has a right to choose her own counsel, “society has a right to insist that, when the
adversary system is invoked, the processes work in accordance with the system’s
premises”); Zywicki, supra note 16, at 308 (describing why the disinterestedness
requirement may not be waivable in bankruptcy because of the history of ethical abuses
in this area and the concern about public confidence in the system). In other situations,
these fiduciary requirements are not waivable because of concerns regarding power
differentials.
156. The power may rest, in part, on knowledge differentials, and thus the
voluntariness and knowledge categories may overlap to a certain extent.
157. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 422 (noting that an attorney has a huge
incentive to encourage waiver, because by sending his client to another attorney, a lawyer
loses not only that particular case but also risks losing future business). To the extent
that fiduciary obligations are imposed to ensure efficiency in specialized exchanges,
conflicts of interest may not be waivable. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 85, at 760
(asserting that “the greater the inequality in bargaining power, the greater the difficulty
of waiver”).
158. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 423.
159. See Bigwood, supra note 142, at 230–31 (stressing that duress (coercion) in
contracts will be determined by examining societal standards or the reasonable
expectation of the parties).
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B. Intention: Knowledge and Capacity to Act
Voluntary action, at minimum, is not the product of an
160
improper controlling influence. For a waiver to be valid, we
might also require that the actor demonstrate the intention to
act.161 For an act to be intentional, the actor must understand the
act and its consequences.162
Knowledge requirements have at least two aspects. Consider
a waiver of trial inherent in a guilty plea. There is a variety of
information linked to the decision—that the plea involves an
admission of guilt, that as a result the adjudicatory process will
move directly to sentencing and no trial will be conducted, and
that the sentencing may include a number of penalties (for
example, jail time, probation, and fines).163 For each decision, we
must establish the following: (1) what information the individual
must know for the decision to be considered autonomous, and (2)
to what extent the individual must know the information, which
is a slightly different issue.164 So, if we require that the individual
understand that his guilty plea will involve an admission that he
committed the crime in question and that certain punishments
may follow, do we also require that the individual be able to
apply the abstract understanding to his own situation (for
example, that he may serve a number of years in jail)? To answer
this question, we need first to examine the different standards of
capacity and their relation to levels of autonomy.165

160. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 19, at 121 (declaring that autonomy
requires “independence from controlling influences”).
161. See id.
162. Knowledge requires both understanding of the current situation as well as
understanding of the consequences of different decisions. Dix, supra note 2, at 234
(“[V]alid waiver should require an awareness of the consequences of waiver that a
reasonable person faced with the choice would consider.”). In Estelle v. Williams, the
Court applied the rule of preclusion, which lacks the knowing element required by waiver.
425 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1976); see also Dix, supra note 2, at 221, 224, 229, 234, 267 (noting
that there is no such thing as “implied waiver”). But see Developments in the Law, supra
note 2, at 1629 n.1 (stating that the doctrine of waiver of evidentiary privilege differs from
traditional concepts waiver in contract or constitutional law, and thus “the holder of an
evidentiary privilege can waive that privilege without ever being aware that he had it”).
163. See Dix, supra note 2, at 221–42 (listing ancillary categories of information
connected to a guilty plea and detailing the judicial treatment of whether knowledge of
the information was necessary for a guilty plea to be upheld as an effective waiver of the
defendant’s rights).
164. See id. (discussing the categories of information a defendant might need to know
to make autonomous decisions).
165. Id. at 260 (“[A]n effective waiver presupposes a defendant’s capacity acceptably
to evaluate and to choose among different courses of action. [However,] [i]t is less clear
what constitutes the requisite capacity . . . .”).

(2)BERGG1.DOC

2003]

5/28/2003 6:31 PM

UNDERSTANDING WAIVER

315

If the validity of a waiver depends on an individual’s
autonomy, how should we conceptualize different levels of
descriptive autonomy? It may not be possible to measure the
autonomy of each decision; instead, we can focus on whether the
individual in question has the capacity to make an autonomous
decision, a slightly easier determination. Capacity here is
evaluated by looking at whether the individual in question
demonstrated the requisite abilities in making a particular
166
It involves neither an abstract determination of
decision.
overall capacity nor an evaluation of the reasonableness or
rationality of the end decision.167 The former would involve many
of the same difficulties as an abstract determination of autonomy
(possibly leading to significant interference with individual
freedom), and the latter would involve external judgments of the
end decision that would essentially negate respect for the
individual’s autonomy.
The MacArthur competence studies identified four capacities
that courts and legislatures have required for autonomous
decisionmaking in different situations—choice, understanding,
168
appreciation, and reasoning. Choice refers to the individual’s
ability to actually make a decision; understanding refers to
comprehension of critical information; appreciation refers to a
type of “deep” understanding or the ability to apply abstractly
understood information to one’s own situation; and reasoning
refers to the ability to rationally manipulate information in
conformance with one’s particular preferences.169 Measuring
capacity to make an autonomous decision, rather than autonomy
166. See Jessica Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of
Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 346–47 (1996)
(explaining that if a patient’s capacity is impaired, the ability to make a competent
decision will be weakened).
167. See id. at 350–51 (listing the relevant capacities to be considered in an
assessment of competence as the following: the ability to communicate a choice; the ability
to understand relevant information; the ability to appreciate the nature of the situation
and its likely consequences; and the ability to manipulate information rationally).
168. Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study:
Development and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 146–47,
153–56 (1997) (discussing each capacity in detail). There were two MacArthur
Competence studies: one focused on competence to make medical decisions, and the other
focused on adjudicative competence. See id. at 141–77 (detailing the MacArthur
Adjudicative Competence Study); see also Berg et al., supra note 166, at 362–74
(describing the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study). There are two aspects of
adjudicative competence: competence to assist counsel and decisional competence. See
Hoge et al., supra, at 146. These break down into specific competence related abilities
(modeled after instruments identified in the treatment context) including understanding,
appreciation, reasoning, and choice. See id. at 149–56.
169. See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 100–06 (discussing the four factors
in the treatment competence setting).
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directly, has two distinct advantages. First, capacities can often
be measured using standardized tools.170 Second, evaluating
capacity requires less intrusion into individual thought
processes, and thus may be less of an infringement on individual
autonomous decisionmaking.171
Once we identify the capacities at stake, we must determine
the standard against which we will judge capacity. Applying the
standard will entail choosing which of the four elements (choice,
172
understanding, appreciation, or reasoning) will be required,
and thus, evaluated, as well as determining how the elements
will be applied.173 For example, in addition to choosing to apply
the understanding element, we will also need to establish what
information needs to be understood and to what degree (50%,
75%, and so forth).174
There has been little discussion of the level of capacity
necessary to waive specific rights. In Godinez v. Moran,175 the
Supreme Court held that for Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights,
the level of capacity needed to waive a right is equivalent to the
level of capacity needed to exercise it.176 This finding may reflect
an acknowledgement that the implications of the waiver in terms
of potential effects on the defendant (for example, imprisonment)
are as significant as those consequences that follow a trial, and
170. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT
TOOL FOR TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) 1–24 (1998) (detailing a test for health professionals
to measure patients’ decisionmaking capacities with regard to informed consent).
171. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 166, at 357–58 (discussing that although
measuring capacity requires an examination of an individual’s thought processes,
specifically the ability to rationally manipulate information, it does not require that the
decision be conventional).
172. The four elements do not necessarily align into a hierarchy. See Berg et al.,
supra note 166, at 357–58 (explaining that missing any one of the elements may cause
incapacitation depending on the circumstances). So the person who fails to evidence
appreciation (for example, “I know gangrene is deadly, but I don’t believe my untreated
gangrene will result in my death”), but does evidence reasoning skills (for example, “I
prefer medical over surgical treatments since I have obligations to support my family that
are not conducive to long recovery periods”) is not clearly more or less autonomous than
the person who demonstrates the reverse capacities. However, compound application of
standards are likely to fall into a hierarchy of stringency (for example, choice alone versus
choice plus understanding versus choice plus understanding plus reasoning). See
generally id. (discussing further this notion).
173. This Article will not discuss constructing competence standards for different
decisions in detail. For additional discussion, see id. at 375–90 (discussing the application
of these components to formulate competence standards).
174. See id. at 384–87 (debating whether the degree of competence should be
determined by a fixed level of performance or a sliding scale).
175. 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding that the competence standard required for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is not higher than the competence level required to
stand trial).
176. Id. at 391.
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thus the individual in question must demonstrate the same
capacity to waive trial as to stand for trial.177 But even if we apply
the same standard (for example, understanding and
appreciation), the actual requirements may be lower in the sense
that the information in question is simply easier to understand
or appreciate. For example, a defendant who waives his right to
trial does not need to understand the intricacies of trial, or be
able to assist counsel in preparing and conducting the trial, but
merely needs to understand that he has a right to a trial on the
facts of the case and that his plea of guilty gives up that right.178
The end result is to make it easier for an individual of dubious
capacity to waive a right than to exercise it.
Moreover, in some situations, we might be less concerned
about the harm of letting someone waive a right than the harm of
having him exercise it in a non-autonomous way, particularly
when the waiver results in a transfer of decisionmaking
authority to another party. Allowing waiver in this context has
an end result of allowing even a possibly incapacitated individual
to control, at least to a certain degree, what happens to him—
here, deciding to grant decisionmaking authority to another
person.179 This, in itself, might be a good that we want to
encourage. For example, waivers of an individual’s right to make
decisions by transferring authority to a fiduciary may be best
180
thought of as “delegations.” Accepting the individual’s waiver
177. See, e.g., James F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1985, at 18–21 (arguing for and describing a sliding scale of standards in
medical situations which increases in rigor as the consequences flowing from
decisionmaking become more serious).
178. See generally Dix, supra note 2, at 260–61 (recognizing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s suggestion of a distinction between competence to waive assistance of counsel and
competence to stand trial).
179. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 808 (explaining that in a
fiduciary relationship a person can grant authority for someone to act as his substitute in
areas he may not be capable or competent to make his own decisions).
180. “Fiduciary” is a term used to describe a particular relationship between two
parties that gives rise to certain legal duties including “good faith, trust, confidence, and
candor.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999). Fiduciaries include agents,
partners, directors and officers, trustees, executors and administrators, receivers, bailees,
guardians, and some professionals such as attorneys or physicians. See, e.g., Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 795–96, 816. Fiduciary relationships are generally
marked by power differentials with the entrusting party (“entrustor”) being dependent on
the fiduciary. See id. at 809. In almost all situations, a fiduciary relationship must be
entered into voluntarily. Id. at 801. The entrustor makes a decision to transfer
decisionmaking authority within a defined scope to the fiduciary—in essence a waiver of
autonomy. See id. at 808 (observing that the fiduciary effectively acts as a substitute for
the entrustor). But the waiver in this case does not simply entail giving up the right in
question, rather it involves a delegation of decisionmaking authority to a recognized
expert (and the delegation is because of that expertise). See id. at 809. Because there are
often both knowledge and skill differentials between the fiduciary and the entrustor, it is
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allows that exercise of autonomy (the choice to have someone else
make the decision) to be respected. In fact, the legal obligations
imposed on fiduciaries are essentially descriptive autonomy
protections.181 Transfer of decisionmaking authority to an expert
through a fiduciary relationship allows an individual to exercise
autonomy, both by allowing the transfer and by ensuring that
decisions are made in light of the individual’s wants and
preferences—basically a proxy for autonomy.182 For delegations to
fiduciaries, or other situations where there are safeguards (legal
or ethical duties required of one of the actors) in place, we might
be comfortable accepting a waiver from individuals who
demonstrate minimal capacity—say a basic understanding that
they hold the right in question and that their action results in
waiving the right. The result is requiring a lower level of capacity
to waive a right than to exercise the right.183 For example, the
difficult, if not impossible, for the entrustor to monitor all aspects of the fiduciary’s
actions. See id. at 813. As a result, the law imposes certain duties on the fiduciary to
protect the more vulnerable entrusting party. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary
Contracting Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51
U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 389–93 (1990) (discussing the disclosures that are necessary in a
fiduciary doctor-patient relationship). In all situations, courts require the “fiduciary to act
with loyalty and skill, in the entrustor’s best interests.” Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra
note 10, at 823; see also Mehlman, supra, at 390 (stating that “[f]iduciary law obligates
the better-informed provider to act in the patient’s best interests”). The entrustor can
define her best interests in particular ways (and thus direct the fiduciary to take certain
actions), but the entrustor cannot waive the fiduciary’s obligation to act in her best
interests. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 821, 823–24.
181. One of the primary obligations of fiduciaries is disclosure, thus facilitating
knowledge and consequently autonomous decisionmaking. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note
180, at 390–91.
182. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ.
L. REV. 303, 350–51 (1999) (arguing that fiduciary relationships promote freedom in the
sense that the fiduciary functions as an “extension” of the entrustor). The limitation on
waiver of certain fiduciary obligations is a recognition that it may be impossible in certain
circumstances to evaluate whether the entrustor’s decision was autonomous. Mehlman,
supra note 180, at 395–96 (identifying obstacles which may lessen the ability of a patient
to make an informed decision). Refer to notes 43, 86, 88 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, not only will disclosure be required, but the fiduciary may need to evaluate capacity
and knowledge and, furthermore, will bear the burden of proving both if the decision in
question is challenged in a court of law. One element that is “unwaivable” is court
supervision over the fiduciary. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 821.
183. Conversely, we might require a fairly high standard of capacity when the
consequences are unusually severe. Consider the judge’s need to act as a teacher as well
as judge in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who waived his right to legal representation
and is defending himself in the September 11 terrorist trial. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis,
Defendant in Sept. 11 Plot Accuses Judge of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A18
(commenting that Judge Brikema had to explain the meaning of a plea of “no contest” to
Moussaoui to protect him from inadvertently pleading guilty). This might have been a
situation in which a higher level of capacity should have been applied, restricting
Moussaoui’s ability to decline legal representation. In fact, the judge in the case required
the previously court-appointed lawyers to remain on “standby” in case she determined
that Moussaoui could no longer defend himself. Id.
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capacity needed to enact a health care power of attorney may be
much lower than the capacity needed actually to make the health
care decisions. In the former situation, the individual need only
demonstrate that he understands his right to make health care
decisions and that he is granting another person the authority to
make those decisions for him. In the latter situation, he may
need to demonstrate appreciation and reasoning skills along with
basic understanding of the situation.
A legislature or court may have to determine what level of
capacity is required to exercise a waiver and how the standard
will be applied.184 Determining this requirement should entail
evaluation of the implications of the waiver. This evaluation
includes considering the seriousness of the consequences that
may flow from the waiver, as well as whether the waiver entails
a transfer of decisionmaking authority to another individual. In
the latter situation, if there are protections in place to assure
that the recipient of the decisionmaking authority is obligated to
promote the individual’s wants and preferences (autonomy) or,
when this is not feasible, promote the individual’s best interests,
a lower capacity requirement will be appropriate.
C. Disclosure and Other Safeguards
Although there are genuine issues regarding setting
standards for evaluating voluntariness and intention, the real
focus in most situations is on determining how to measure the
level of autonomy at issue, and that translates into the question:
How much proof of autonomy will we require? We do not require
individuals to prove their autonomy in the abstract; rather we
scrutinize certain decisions. This question can be rephrased as
whether specific requirements (“safeguards”) should be applied
around the decisionmaking process. Such safeguards include
tests for determining whether the individual actually has, and
demonstrates, the capacity and knowledge for intentional action.
Which safeguards to apply depends on the level of autonomy at
issue.185
Arguably,
any
interference
with
individual
184. Setting standards for capacity is probably one of the least understood and
analyzed areas of law. See, e.g., Berg et. al, supra note 166, at 347–48 (stating that
“[c]ases and statutes generally lack sufficient analysis of competence and its different
elements” and relevant terms “may be poorly defined and used indiscriminately”).
185. Mill uses the example of freedom of thought and opinion. See Mill, supra note
21, at 50 (stating that liberty “comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness;
demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion of sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative,
scientific, moral or theological”). Thought is most closely linked to personal identity, and
thus most closely approximates the notion of autonomy. Id. Mill adds to this first aspect,
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freedom to frame one’s own life pursuit, as well as freedom to associate with whom one
wants. Id.
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the
plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly from this liberty of each individual,
follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals;
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others.
Id.
Current judicial protections of autonomy encompass privacy in the sense of
personal information and personal space, along with freedom to make certain kinds of
decisions about one’s life. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 197–
98. But the Court, in affording certain protections to autonomous decisionmaking, has
clearly limited the notion of freedom to develop individual intellect and emotion to those
decisions within traditionally private realms and, in some cases, to only those choices that
are themselves considered “traditional.” See id. at 197–99. Decisions regarding marital
privacy and whether to bear or beget a child are considered traditionally private, and thus
considered closely related to autonomy. See id. at 197–98. Likewise, Professor Smith
points out that the standards in both the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment
context have also been linked to traditional social expectations and conventions. Id. at
197–99. But as he correctly states, there are a number of problems with the Court’s
approach, including the following: (1) “the appeal to social morality is difficult to
implement, and therefore unpredictable,” and (2) “if sincerely applied, it seems likely to
undercut the Court’s role in opposing conventional prejudices and protecting minorities.”
Id. at 201–02.
The Supreme Court’s recent determinations that physician-assisted suicide is
not part of the notion of liberty or autonomy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause are evidence of the first problem, as current tradition (the last twenty
years), at least arguably, encompasses the right of patients to determine the time and
manner of their death. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804–10 (1997) (holding that
a state ban on physician assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because there is a distinction between refusing life-sustaining treatment and suicide); id.
at 809–10 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “assisted suicide is [not] a
fundamental right entitled to recognition at this time” under the due process standard);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 735 (1997) (holding that a state ban on
assisted suicide did not violate the Due Process Clause because it is not a fundamental
liberty interest and is rationally related to governmental interests). Yet the Court,
reaching back over the past century or more, concluded that within that larger time
frame, traditionally, suicide has been impermissible. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19.
Thus part of the problem appears to rest on appropriately identifying the time-relevant
tradition. The second concern is of greater scale since it raises significant questions about
the role of courts as guardians of individual rights against majority rule. Tradition is most
easily defined as those practices embraced by the majority over time. See id. at 710–16
(evaluating “tradition” by examining the practices in other states and democracies over
hundreds of years). But if protections for individual autonomy are to mean anything, they
must accommodate varying practices among vastly different people. Thus limiting
autonomy protections to those practices or decisions that are deemed “traditional” seems
to undermine the basic goal of allowing individuals to develop in their own unique way.
Rather than jettison autonomy or liberal theory as a unifying framework,
Professor Smith proposes three alternatives. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy,
supra note 19, at 203–04. The first is to accept a theoretical process under which
individuals jointly define the limits of freedom. Id. at 204 (commenting that this may
create “standards that the bulk of the modern American community would accept on
reflection”). He cites John Rawls and Professor Bruce Ackerman (who advocates deciding
“between competing standards by imagining the results of dialogues between their
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decisionmaking will infringe upon autonomy, at least the
minimal level of autonomy inherent in any voluntary action.186 If
the issue is maximizing autonomy, infringements should only be
tolerated when the autonomy at stake is great enough to justify
additional scrutiny of the individual’s decision. Moreover,
imposition of a safeguard should increase autonomy.187 Given the
presumption in favor of allowing individual waivers as
autonomous acts and the difficulty in actually measuring the
autonomy at stake in particular cases, the question is: Are the
consequences of a potential non-autonomous waiver significant
enough to justify imposing safeguards around the waiver
process?

adherents, subject to certain constraints”). Id. Professor Smith stresses that a problem
with this approach is that it does not deal with those people who would refuse to accept
Rawls’s original position or Professor Ackerman’s initial constraints. Id. The second
alternative is to define autonomy in a limited manner. Id. However, Professor Smith
notes that such a position is likely to be incompatible with the two premises of autonomy:
“first, that one’s unique nature provides the highest standards for one’s actions, and
second, that one’s nature is best known to one’s self.” Id. (footnote omitted). And the third
alternative is to link the notion of autonomy to the early liberal conception of individual
liberty. Id. at 205 (noting that such an approach suffers from all of the problems
previously identified, including how the notion of autonomy is compatible with such limits
as “rationality”). Although he does not go into a detailed analysis, Smith clearly favors the
first option. Id. at 204 (referring to it as the “most attractive” approach). The alternative
formulations for defining autonomy seem incompatible with the underlying concept. Id. at
204–05 (questioning the feasibility of the last two proposed approaches to autonomy).
Moreover, there is considerable appeal in defining the limits of autonomy using a type of
“consent” theory, because it seems most respectful of individual freedom in the first place.
186. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1486 (noting that when a right protects
autonomy, scrutiny of the reasons for waiving the right is “inconsistent with protecting
individual sovereignty over the decision”); see also Garnett, supra note 87, at 487–89
(highlighting the inconsistency of both relying on a justifying notion of consent out of
respect for autonomy, and scrutinizing individual consent to determine whether it meets
some subjectively determined standard of rationality). Garnett uses the example of
consent to human experimentation and argues that either individuals should be able to
consent to any experimentation (full respect for autonomy), or there should be some
experiments that are impermissible regardless of consent (acknowledging other values
beyond autonomy). Id. at 489–90. Professor Garnett supports the latter position. Id. at
511 (concluding that “we must place objective limits on what we permit ourselves to do to
each other”).
187. See, e.g., Matthew S. Ferguson, Ethical Postures of Futility and California’s
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2002) (observing that a
judge may consider whether statutorily imposed safeguards promote a patient’s
autonomy). If our goal is maximizing autonomy, then we must apply rules that result in
an overall increase of autonomy. However, it is important to recognize that the weighing
cannot occur on a case-by-case basis. That is, we cannot justify extreme limits on one
person’s autonomy because it would increase the autonomy of other people. Nor is it
appropriate to reverse the situation and allow an individual to opt-out of a safeguard in
order to increase his own autonomy. The rules in question must be ones that individuals
would agree to ahead of time because they result in overall maximization of everyone’s
autonomy, even if this entails limiting autonomy in certain cases.
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For decisions with relatively minor implications—for
188
example, whether or not to hire one lawyer versus another —we
do not actually evaluate the autonomy of the decision to hire one
attorney in lieu of another. In contrast, we require increased
safeguards—perhaps requiring a judge’s or health professional’s
explicit evaluation of autonomy—for decisions to represent
189
oneself at trial. We require different levels of proof or different
protections of autonomy depending on the circumstances. For
example, waivers of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in the Miranda context require that law
enforcement inform the individual that he has a right to remain
silent, that if he says anything it can be used against him in a
criminal proceeding, and that he has a right to counsel.190
Alternatively, we might proceed further and require that in
addition to disclosure, someone test understanding by asking the
individual questions based on the information. Thus, waivers of
the Sixth Amendment right to trial require the judge to inquire
into whether the defendant understands that, by entering a plea
of guilty, a sentence will be imposed.191
The most basic safeguards relate to disclosure requirements.
In a variety of settings, the Supreme Court has held that
individuals must know they have a particular right before they
192
can waive that right. When the consequences of a potentially
188. Of course, there may be significant implications of hiring different lawyers, due
to varying skill levels. Although we may not provide a priori safeguards to ensure
autonomous choice between lawyers, the system does have mechanisms to appeal
decisions based on attorney incompetence, as well as avenues to recover financially from
an inept lawyer through malpractice suits. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice,
Professional Discipline, and Representation of the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV.
1171, 1202–05 (1988) (discussing available remedies for poor representation).
189. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975) (holding that when the
defendant is found to be literate, competent, understanding, and voluntarily exercising
informed free will, a court cannot require representation by a lawyer).
190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
191. Waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to trial, by entry of a guilty plea, require
a judge to explain the nature of the charges, the consequences of a conviction, and that by
pleading guilty the defendant waives his right to a trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (providing
that a court must determine the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the
maximum and minimum sentences, the right to representation by attorney, and the right
to plea not guilty). The consequences of a conviction include any applicable minimum
sentence and the maximum possible sentence the defendant may receive. Id.; James J.
Gildea, Guilty Pleas, 72 GEO. L.J. 477, 483–485 (1983).
192. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (stating that waiver “is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”
and that ignorance of the right to counsel makes the waiver invalid). Knowledge
requirements are not limited to criminal law—there are disclosure requirements in
contract law contexts as well. See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 656 (2002) (noting
that waivers are not effectual unless made with knowledge of the circumstances); Richard
B. Malamud & John E. Karayan, Contractual Waivers for Minors in Sports-Related
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non-autonomous waiver are minor, this knowledge might be
presumed, or at least no additional safeguards will be put in
place to assess knowledge. Thus, Fourth Amendment waivers in
consent searches are not explicitly required to be knowing.193 By
contrast, in some settings the concern will be greater, and thus
specific safeguards will be put in place. For example, Miranda
warnings are designed to inform defendants of their rights under
the Fifth Amendment.194
In contrast to the voluntariness prong of waivers, which is
195
generally dealt with on a post hoc basis, the intention prong
may be addressed through a priori safeguards.196 Whether to
apply such safeguards, which include tests of individual capacity
or disclosure requirements, depends on the seriousness of the
consequences that flow from a non-autonomous waiver. In other
words, if we assume that individual waivers deserve deference
and that attempts to determine the autonomy of a particular
waiver involve state interference with individual decisionmaking,
then governmental restrictions on waivers should only be
imposed when the risks of allowing a non-autonomous waiver
outweigh the impositions on individual autonomy.197 These
Activities, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 151, 160 (1992) (discussing knowledge requirements with
respect to disclosure of the waiver provision); Georgette C. Poindexter, Estopped in the
Name of Waiver: The Role of Waiver and Estoppel in Commercial Leasing, 25 REAL EST.
L.J. 267, 268–69 (1997) (stating that knowledge of the existence of the right is required
for waiver of contractual rights under a lease); Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for
Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court,
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 460 (1997) (discussing knowledge requirements for
contractual waivers of jury trials).
193. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the
right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not
establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”). This situation is
probably not a case where knowledge is presumed, but no additional safeguards are put in
place. Refer to Part III.B supra.
194. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves . . . . In order to
combat [the pressures of interrogation] and to permit a free opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights . . . .
Id.
195. But refer to note 151 supra and accompanying text.
196. Of course, the first time a court decides a case, the safeguards will not have
been put in place. Thus, the Miranda warnings arose out of a case questioning whether
police had to warn suspects. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439–42. Prior to the landmark decision,
there were no judicially required knowledge safeguards. See id. at 440–42.
197. In contrast, in the criminal procedure context, Professor Spritzer argues that
safeguards should be applied in all cases to assure capable and knowing waivers, and only
when safeguards prove infeasible or too costly should system considerations be taken into
account. Spritzer, supra note 2, at 514. He specifically finds fault with the lack of
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determinations will depend on an analysis of the descriptive
autonomy right or protection in question and the secondary goals
of the system.
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, autonomy is
a beginning point of analysis.198 It best explains why there are
different limitations on waivers and why the specific
requirements for a valid waiver exist.199 But even if we assume
that the overall goal is to promote autonomy, there may be
disagreement about the means of achieving that goal. For
example, an efficiency approach would say that creating rules
that lead to the most efficient system will result in the most
overall autonomy, otherwise governmental interference with
individuals will be allowed to a greater extent than necessary.200
Alternatively, a distributive justice approach will be concerned
with the distributive (or non-distributive) effects of particular
rules, arguing that equality of treatment is crucial for
maximizing autonomy.201 So, an analysis of the consequences of a
potential non-autonomous waiver requires consideration of what
measurements will be used to evaluate those consequences.202 In
this sense, an autonomy analysis does not so much displace other
theories, as it provides an overarching framework to situate
disparate approaches.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
The previous sections of this Article have laid the foundation
for evaluating waivers. The Article argues that the framework
described above functions both descriptively and normatively.
Although there may be additional reasons justifying the
outcomes of the cases described, the autonomy framework
provides the best basis for analysis.203 Moreover, it is one that
safeguards in the Fourth Amendment context. Id. His argument reverses the general
presumption under an autonomy framework that government interference with
individual decisionmaking is inappropriate. Refer to note 19 supra and accompanying text
(discussing governmental interference on individual autonomy).
198. Refer to notes 19–27 supra and accompanying text (discussing the implications
of autonomy).
199. Id.
200. Refer to notes 16–18 supra and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency
rationale).
201. See C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties that Bind
Parties Together, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 861 (2002) (discussing “the Aristotelian notion
of distributive justice,” which corrects harm resulting from a disequilibrium in the
relationship).
202. The analysis will also depend on what the system’s secondary goals are. Refer to
Part IV.A infra.
203. Refer to notes 19–27 supra and accompanying text.
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reflects factors the courts actually do and should apply in
analyzing waivers. Abstract formulations are always limited, so
to elucidate the step-by-step analysis, the following subsections
apply the theory to examples. The first part of this section,
addressing waiver of informed consent for medical care, tests the
application of the theory to a novel case, which will be examined
in detail. The second part looks at two areas—waivers of Fourth
Amendment rights via consent to search and waivers of statutory
protections via contract.
Before delving into the examples, it is worth reiterating the
steps a court should take in determining whether to honor a
party’s decision to waive a particular right. The presumption in
all cases is that a waiver is valid, so the question is whether, in
the specific case, the waiver should be limited or safeguards
should be applied around the waiver process to assure a valid
waiver. The first step a court should undertake in evaluating a
waiver is to consider whether there are any system or ascriptive
autonomy reasons for limiting the waiver.204 Notably, few waivers
will be restricted on these grounds. The second step is to
determine whether the waiver may be considered valid based on
205
the descriptive autonomy analysis described above.
The
examples below involve descriptive autonomy protections.
Recall that there are four reasons why a waiver of a
descriptive autonomy protection could be restricted: (1) the rule
must be applied in all cases in order to function as an
appropriate protection of autonomy; (2) waivers could never be
autonomous given the power differentials in the context; (3) it
would be impossible or too costly to establish in each case that
the waiver lacked autonomy; or (4) in the particular case, the
waiver is invalid because it failed either the voluntariness or
206
intention requirements. There are few areas in which we limit
waivers based on either requirements that a rule be applied in all
cases or prior assumptions about the absence of autonomy in all
cases. The third rationale—limiting waivers because of the cost
or burden associated with determining autonomy on a case-bycase basis—is more plausible, and thus courts should seriously
consider whether a situation is one in which such concerns
function to restrict waivers. When the balance does not favor an
across-the-board limitation of waiver for any of the first three
reasons, the court should focus on the specific waiver at issue and
determine whether it meets the requirements for voluntariness
204.
205.
206.

Refer to Part II.C supra.
Refer to Part III.A–B supra.
Refer to note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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and intention. With respect to voluntariness, the inquiry entails
consideration of whether improper (unfair) coercion deprived the
individual’s decision of the force it would otherwise have.207 Both
the source of the pressure and the type of pressure will be
relevant, and different standards may apply depending on the
type of waiver in question and our general societal notions of
fairness in different contexts. For example, compare the role of
governmental pressure in the criminal procedure context to
concerns about private pressure in the contract context.208 With
respect to intention, the court must consider whether the
autonomy given up as part of the waiver is significant enough to
trigger safeguards to assess capacity and to assure knowledge,
rather than simply assume a capable and informed
decisionmaker. This analysis will entail an evaluation of the
consequences of a waiver. The following three examples will
demonstrate how this framework should be applied.
A. Waiver of Informed Consent to Make Medical Decisions209
There are a number of reasons for choosing this example to
develop in more detail. First, although little attention has been
paid to waiver requirements generally, some theoretical work has
been done in this area.210 Second, issues of waiver of informed
207. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 88 (noting that “inducements, persuasion,
and authority are all forms of pressure that may be considered coercive in certain
circumstances, depending on individual perception,” but that doctors should nonetheless
“feel comfortable advocating for a particular treatment option and attempting to convince
a patient to exercise his decisionmaking rights to consent”).
208. Refer to notes 147–50 supra and accompanying text (discussing waivers in
criminal procedure and contract law).
209. These comments do not apply to waivers of informed consent for research
participation. First, the term is generally used in that context to refer to “waivers”
permitted by independent research boards for research in emergency situations, not to
individual waivers—arguably not a situation of waiver at all, at least under this Article’s
definition. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 390–91 (2002) (discussing
the FDA’s regulations pertaining to experimental treatment). Second, the concerns with
allowing a non-autonomous waiver in the research context are likely to be greater than
those in the treatment context, and thus, the balance may come out differently under the
autonomy framework. Id. at 390–92.
210. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85–90. Although the notion of waiver of
informed consent is not new, the contours of the legal doctrine remain undefined. Id. at
85. A few cases acknowledge that there are limits to informed consent, but fail to explain
important problems of definition and application. Id.; see Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11
(Cal. 1972) (“The scope of the physician’s communications to the patient . . . must be
measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision.”); Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
(reasoning that when a doctor’s “attempts at explanation [are] prevented by [the] patient’s
insistence on remaining ignorant of the risks involved,” the patient cannot later complain
that “consent to the procedure was not an informed one”); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of
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consent in this context are particularly timely.211 For example,
waiver has recently been proffered as a solution for some
problems involving health care services. One proponent suggests
that patients may contractually “waive” their right to receive
certain treatments, or information about those treatments, in
exchange for paying lower insurance premiums.212 Waiver of
informed consent seems intuitively permissible because the idea
behind the doctrine of informed consent is to allow patients to
control what happens to them and control over participation in
213
decisionmaking is a crucial element of waiver. Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive how one would “force” informed consent on
an unwilling patient. Nonetheless, not all commentators agree
214
that waiver of informed consent should be permitted. The
uneasiness with the concept seems to stem as much from the
uncertainty surrounding application of the informed consent
doctrine as from fundamental disagreement regarding the
concept of waiver itself. Without further exploration of waivers in
general, and informed consent waivers specifically, proposals,
like the one regarding waiver of information in exchange for
lower insurance premiums, are difficult to evaluate.
In addition, informed consent protections are an obvious
example of protections put in place to increase descriptive
autonomy. Although the idea that individuals have an inherent
right to control what happens to their bodies, including what
medical care to receive, it is also linked to an ascriptive notion of
215
autonomy; the disclosure obligations placed upon health care
Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County July 10, 1973), reprinted
in 1 Mental Disability L. Rptr. 147, 149 (1976) (“Generally, individuals are allowed free
choice about whether to undergo experimental medical procedures. But the State has the
power to modify this free choice concerning experimental procedures when it cannot be
freely given, or when the result would be contrary to public policy.”); Holt v. Nelson, 523
P.2d 211, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that when considering whether a patient’s
consent was informed, the necessary “causal connection exists when, but only when,
disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in a decision
against [treatment]”).
211. I initially became interested in the topic of waivers because of my work in the
area of informed consent. Working on the assumption that it is best to develop and apply
a new legal theory (here of waiver) in an area in which one has some expertise, informed
consent seemed the logical place to begin!
212. Hall, supra note 2, at 566–69; see also Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing
Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 351–
62 (1997) (critiquing Hall’s suggestion).
213. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85.
214. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 122–24 (1984)
(arguing that informed consent should not be waived).
215. See, e.g., Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman, Of Mice but Not Men:
Problems of the Randomized Clinical Trial, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1585, 1587 (1991)
(“The right to be treated as an individual deserving the physician’s best judgment and
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professionals illustrate a recognition that increased information
leads to greater autonomy.216 Thus, informed consent
requirements help to assure autonomous decisionmaking and to
promote autonomy in a descriptive sense.
Analysis of waiver of informed consent provides an
opportunity to consider waiver of descriptive autonomy
protections. Recall that there are four bases for limiting waivers
of descriptive autonomy protections, three of which justify across217
These three are based on a
the-board restrictions.
determination that the waiver: (1) would undermine the
application of a rule generally, thus affecting other’s autonomy;
(2) could never be autonomous; or (3) could never be proven to be
autonomous.218 Allowing individual patients to choose how
involved they will be in their medical decisions will not
undermine either the medical care system as a whole, nor the
informed consent doctrine specifically. Although there may be
some concern that widespread use of waiver in the informed
consent context could dissuade physicians from sharing
information,219 this is unlikely to be the case both because
waivers of informed consent will not be prevalent220 and because
care, rather than be used as a means to [an end] . . . is inherent in every person. This
right, based on the concept of dignity, cannot be waived.”).
216. Informed consent is a rule designed to protect an individual’s right to bodily
integrity (a notion closely linked with autonomy). See Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet,
62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 312–13 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting that three other district courts, in
“well-reasoned opinions,” ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate against invasion
of bodily integrity includes the right to consent). The constitutional dimensions of a right
to make medical decisions are not entirely clear, but the Supreme Court has supported
such a right in two lines of jurisprudence—abortion cases and refusal of treatment cases.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that “the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” involves “the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy” and are therefore “central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990) (“The
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses
the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”). In both areas the Court has
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution creates a sphere of privacy, drawn primarily
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, within which we can ground an
individual’s right to make decisions concerning her medical care. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in
addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the liberty specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights . . . to bodily integrity . . . . We
have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the
traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”).
217. Refer to notes 87–88 supra and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 86 (1994).
220. Waivers are not likely to be prevalent in light of the fact that most patients
want to participate in decisionmaking. See Krause, supra note 212, at 305 (describing
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other protections continue to push physicians towards disclosure
and encourage patient involvement in decisionmaking.221
Moreover, although fiduciary protections are put in place because
of concerns about the knowledge differentials between doctor and
patient, informed consent is not a situation in which it would be
impossible in all cases to have an autonomous waiver decision.
Furthermore, determining autonomy within the context of a
waiver of informed consent is similar to determining autonomy
within the context of an informed consent decision itself—
something physicians are already required to do—and thus it is
neither too difficult nor too costly to require case-by-case
analysis. As a result, informed consent waivers should be
examined for validity in light of the circumstances of each
situation.222
The first part of the analysis of validity focuses on
voluntariness. For most procedures, and in the absence of
obvious coercion (for example, physical force or threats), we
should accept a patient’s waiver at face value. In fact, this is
what occurs when a patient makes the treatment decision
herself; the voluntariness of the treatment choice is presumed,
absent any indication of improper coercion. Moreover, as
previously noted, voluntariness is best evaluated post hoc
because, apart from a doctor’s professional ethical obligations to
avoid pressuring patients, there are few safeguards against
coercion. Likewise, we are generally unconcerned with pressures
from family members because we assume familial obligations will
223
However, we do require that
provide appropriate limits.
informed consent as being grounded on the concept that “when there are several
appropriate treatment options for a condition . . . (patients) want to be able to choose for
themselves which one to receive” (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted)); see
also Charles Sabatino, Legislative Trends in Health-Care Decisionmaking, ABA
BIOETHICS BULL., Summer 1994, at 10 (reporting that “[t]he consumer movement in
health care continues to champion patient autonomy and choice”).
221. For example, ethical standards require that physicians disclose information and
include patients in decisionmaking. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
opinion 8.08, at 165 (2000).
222. See generally Mehlman, supra note 180, at 415–16 (arguing that patient
decisions to waive information disclosures in the informed consent context should “only be
upheld if they represent[] the patient’s direct, voluntary and informed choice at the time
they were entered into”). There has been some debate about the characterization of
fiduciary duties and whether they can be waived under contract law principles. See, e.g.,
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211–12 (1995)
(arguing that waiver should be allowed, as long as entrustors are put on clear notice and
the fiduciaries provide information to enable the entrustor to make an informed decision
to waive).
223. Moreover, it is not clear that pressure from family members (other than threats
of force) should even be considered improper pressures such that the resulting waiver is
deemed coerced. In fact, these transfers work similarly to transfers to fiduciaries because
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physicians, in their fiduciary role, at least reassure themselves
that the patient’s request to waive informed consent is
voluntary.224 This requirement might entail a simple inquiry into
the reasons for the waiver and whether there was any improper
external pressure involved.225
The second part of the analysis focuses on intent,
considering applicable standards for patient capacity to make a
waiver, and determining what, if any, safeguards should be put
in place to assess capacity and assure knowledge. This Article
will address each of these issues in turn. Initially, it is important
to recognize that there are two elements of informed consent,
disclosure and choice, and a patient may seek to waive either or
226
both. Each possibility has different implications for evaluations
of capacity and knowledge.
227

1. Capacity
Patients who decide to waive the consent aspect but
maintain that they want to receive all information are the
easiest to deal with. Essentially the patient may be saying
that she will acquiesce in whatever the physician’s final
recommendation is, but that she wants to remain informed.
One way to look at this is . . . [that] the patient [is] actually
making a choice between treatments, but basing that choice
on the physician’s recommendation[—in other words, the
patient might be seen as ratifying the physician’s
recommendation in advance]. Alternatively, the patient
may want . . . a family member [to] make the decision. Here
too, one might say that the patient is making the choice
228
based on what the family member recommends.

the family member who was granted decisionmaking authority would be required to
choose a treatment based upon what the surrogate knows of the patient’s preferences,
thus approximating an autonomous decision by the patient himself. BERG ET AL., supra
note 19, at 110, 113.
224. Refer to notes 179–82 supra (discussing delegation to a fiduciary).
225. Of course, this analysis may address concerns about coercion stemming from
family members, but it is less likely to address concerns about pressure from the
physician herself. But, as noted previously, fiduciaries have fairly clear legal obligations
to promote their patients’ interests, and this alone might serve to mitigate some fears
regarding coercion. Id.
226. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 88–90 (discussing patients who decide to waive
consent versus patients who decide to waive information).
227. Material for this and the following subsection was drawn, in part, from chapter
four of Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice. BERG ET AL., supra note 19,
at 85–90.
228. Id. at 89 (emphasis omitted).
[I]n both cases there may difficulty in documenting legally valid informed
consent. A patient who waives her right to decide may not want to sign a consent
form, and may not even want to be asked what her decision is in a particular
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Letting a patient of dubious capacity shift decisionmaking
authority to the physician or a family member (or any other
229
proxy chosen by the patient) allows the patient to exercise some
autonomy. Moreover, as noted previously, in situations where
decisionmaking authority is delegated to a fiduciary, we may not
require a high level of capacity.230 The analysis for delegation to a
family member is similar. In the absence of capacity,
decisionmaking authority usually shifts to the family based on
the assumption that close family members are best able to
determine what the patient would choose had he been competent
(“substituted judgment”) or, in the absence of evidence of the
patient’s preferences, are best able to determine what is in the
patient’s best interests.231 Accordingly, a delegation to a family
member in the informed consent context is as, if not more,
appropriate as a delegation to a fiduciary (physician).232 Both
serve to safeguard the patient’s interests because in each case,
the proxy is required to make the decision in a manner that best
respects the patient’s autonomy.233 Therefore, both should
234
generally be allowed if the patient shows minimal capacity.
case. These are things she may prefer to have handled by the person chosen to
make the decision. But most healthcare proxies are designed to take effect only
when a patient is incompetent. Thus it remains unclear whether a proxy would
have legal authority to make decisions for a competent patient. In part this is an
artifact of the surrogate statutes that are designed to allow designation of a
proxy in anticipation of later incapacity, as opposed to traditional proxy statutes
that permit immediate assumption of decisionmaking authority. An additional
problem is that most of the statutes do not allow physicians to assume surrogate
decisionmaking authority, and thus a waiver that essentially entails the patient
saying “[c]hoose whichever treatment you think is best, doctor,” may not
represent a valid transfer of decisionmaking authority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
229. Id. at 112 (discussing possible choices for selecting a surrogate).
230. Id. at 87.
231. Id. at 113–16.
232. It is worth recognizing that most state surrogate decisionmaking statutes
specifically restrict the physician, or other treating health care professional, from being
designated as the decisionmaker. See Colleen M. O’Connor, Statutory Surrogate Consent
Provisions: An Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 128,
131 (1996) (noting that only six state statutes authorize a physician to serve as
decisionmaker in the absence of an available surrogate). This is a technical legal problem
and warrants further attention. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 90 (discussing waivers
of informed consent).
233. Bart J. Collopy, The Moral Underpinning of the Proxy-Provider Relationship:
Issues of Trust and Distrust, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 37, 37–38 (1999) (noting that “the
proxy and physician are morally linked by a mutual commitment to the autonomy and
well-being of the patient”).
234. For example, we might require the same standard of capacity as needed to
designate a proxy, which is a lower standard than that required for actually making the
decision. See, e.g., Greg A. Sachs et al., Ethical Aspects of Dementia Research: Informed
Consent and Proxy Consent, 42 CLINICAL RES. 403, 410 (1994) (finding that a large
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Similarly, a waiver of both disclosure and choice should be
allowed in most situations as an appropriate transfer of
decisionmaking authority.235
[However,] [p]atients who waive the [right to receive
information disclosure], but not decisionmaking authority,
present . . . difficulties. . . . [A] patient who does not want to
hear about the risks of treatment before [choosing an
236
option] arguably is making an incompetent decision.
On the other hand, compelling patients to receive
information that they do not want would . . . deny selfdetermination. The answer to this problem might lie in how
much understanding is necessary to make a decision an
effective demonstration of self-determination. One
possibility is to allow patients to waive information
[disclosure] . . . only if they are aware . . . of the nature of
the information they are waiving. Thus, a patient who
waives information about risks must be aware that the
treatment in question involves risk, and perhaps even
serious risk, but would be allowed to make a decision
237
without knowing the exact nature of the risks.
number of dementia patients had the capacity to designate a surrogate decisionmaker,
even though they would have failed adequately to understand and make decisions about
participation in a research protocol).
235. There may be some limits here, depending on the significance of the decision.
We generally place additional restrictions on surrogate decisionmaking regarding end-oflife decisions, such as withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g.,
Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (holding that the states
may require safeguards around surrogate decisionmaking involving life-sustaining
treatment, including higher evidentiary standards).
236. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 89. From a practical standpoint it might be hard
to distinguish these cases from those in which a patient just “tunes out” when risk
information is disclosed and makes a decision without incorporating the information.
Evaluation of whether the patient exercised the appropriate capacities in making the
decision should help (for example, the patient who fails to indicate any understanding or
appreciation of risks when questioned would fail to exercise the appropriate capacities),
but it will not solve the problem in all cases. Id. at 87. The reality of informed consent is
that patients may make incompetent decisions, but when those decisions are in accord
with the recommendations of physicians, or in accord with the choices of most people, they
are rarely scrutinized. See generally id. at 106–09 (discussing determinations of
incompetence). While this does not provide ideal protections for autonomous
decisionmaking, even scrutinizing a decision involves some imposition on autonomy, and
thus we may want to limit such interference to cases where the outcome (decision) in
question is one that raises particular concern. This is not to say that unusual decisions
should not be respected—that is, after all, what respecting autonomy is about. But they
may be subject to additional scrutiny.
237. Id. at 89–90.
But unlike a waiver of a particular type of information, such as risk information,
a wholesale waiver that included all information about a treatment, for example,
the patient says “Just tell me the names of the treatments and I’ll pick one,”
would not meet the [capacity] requirement. Physicians justifiably may be wary of
relying on the patient’s choice under such circumstances. The solution in these
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This is in accord with the notion described earlier that the
issue in some waiver situations is not application of a different
standard for capacity, but that the information in question is
238
simply easier to grasp. Thus rather than understand in detail
all of the risks of a particular treatment, the patient who waives
risk information need only understand that risks are possible
along with the magnitude of the risk, such as life threatening
issues versus minor discomfort, and that she has a right to
additional information regarding the risks.
2. Disclosure and Safeguards. Decisions about medical
239
The significant
treatment are closely linked to autonomy.
autonomy given up must be outweighed by an assurance that the
waiver itself is autonomous.240 However, the consequences of a
waiver of the right to informed consent are not as significant as
situations where a right is given up completely. As pointed out, a
waiver of consent authorization results in another party (either a
fiduciary or family) making the decision. Both a fiduciary and
other surrogates are legally required to make decisions in the
patient’s interests, as the patient would have defined those
interests.241 Moreover, waivers of information result in greater
reliance on the physician’s recommendations. Assuming the
situations may be the same as the solution in the case where patients waive both
information and decisionmaking authority. Ideally patients should be
encouraged to identify a third party who can both receive information and make
decisions. Again, we [might have] some of the problems outlined [above], since
many state statutes are not set up to accommodate competent patients who want
to transfer decisionmaking authority. But this is likely to be a technical problem
only. Competent patients in these circumstances should be treated as patients
who have some capacity, but not full capacity, to make the medical decision at
hand. In these cases, patient assent rather than consent would be sought. The
assent requirement allows the patient to participate in the decision, but enables
the physician to receive legally valid consent from a fully informed third party.
Id. at 90.
238. Refer to notes 175–78 supra and accompanying text.
239. It is also an area closely linked to deliberative autonomy. See, e.g., Ken Marcus
Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent and Deliberative
Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 987–93 (1999) (applying Professor Fleming’s theory of “the
capacity for a conception of the good” to informed consent for medical care).
240. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85 (explaining that “the waiver exception [to
informed consent] is focused on promoting the same value as the doctrine of informed
consent itself—autonomy”).
241. Using a substituted judgment standard essentially requires that the
decisionmaker promote the patient’s interests, as the patient herself would have defined
them, autonomously. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 112–15 (discussing standards of
surrogate decisionmaking). A best interests standard ensures that in the absence of
evidence of what the patient would consider to be in her interests, an objective
determination will be made of what most people in the situation in question would have
wanted—again, hopefully, a rough approximation of what an autonomous person would
have decided. Id.
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protections inherent in the fiduciary relationship function as they
should,242 the harms of allowing a potentially non-autonomous
waiver should be minimal.
Furthermore, disclosure safeguards in this context are less
appropriate. A Miranda-type warning given at the beginning of
an encounter, or the start of every informed consent disclosure, is
not suitable. Physicians should be required specifically to inform
patients of their right to make medical decisions only upon an
indication from the patient that she would like to waive her right
to participate.243 If physicians must explain to all patients their
rights not to have information disclosed, there is a risk that
patients might infer that they ought not to want information or
that the physician does not want it disclosed.244 The patientphysician relationship is not characterized by the same
adversarial relationship as between a suspect and a policeman.
Therefore, initial warning statements concerning individual
rights are appropriate in the suspect-policeman relationship, but
the same cannot be said about the patient-physician relationship.
As a result, a physician should have no absolute obligation to
inform a patient of her rights in an initial encounter, but may
assume that the act of disclosing information and requesting
patient consent (an obligation the physician already has) implies
that a patient has the right to the information and to make a
decision about treatment.245 However, when a patient expresses a
desire not to participate in the decisionmaking process, a
conditional obligation arises to inform the patient of her rights.246
Moreover, upon informing a patient, the physician should also be
242. There is certainly some question of whether the fiduciary protections do
function appropriately in the patient-physician relationship, given the competing
financial and other incentives that affect physician treatment recommendations. See, e.g.,
Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 399, 415 (1996) (describing the effect insurance incentive schemes
have on physicians).
243. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85 (stating that “physicians should have no
absolute obligation to inform patients of their rights in an initial encounter . . . . However,
when patients express a desire not to participate in the decisionmaking process, a
conditional obligation arises to inform them of their rights”). In practice, patients must be
informed of the following:
(1) physicians have a duty to disclose information to them about treatment, (2)
[they] have a legal right to make decisions about treatment, (3) physicians
cannot render treatment without their consent, and (4) the right of decision
includes a right to consent to or to refuse treatment. Unless a particular patient
is far more knowledgeable than most, [he or] she is unlikely to know all this
without being told by the physician.
Id.
244. See id. at 86.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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required to test for patient comprehension of her rights to a
minimal extent, perhaps by asking a few basic questions
regarding the patient’s understanding of her right to obtain
information and choose between treatments.
3. Summary. In sum, waivers of informed consent to make
medical decisions should be permissible in most individual
treatment contexts. Moreover, given patients’ differing interests
in both obtaining information and participating in
decisionmaking, legal mechanisms to allow waivers should be
developed. But waivers will not be appropriate under all
circumstances because the autonomy given up as part of the
waiver decision should be counterbalanced by the autonomy
demonstrated by the waiver itself. The result may be that using
the concept of waiver to solve current health care delivery crises,
such as allowing “waivers” of information about certain
treatments in exchange for paying lower insurance premiums,247
are acceptable only when the appropriate balance is struck
between the autonomy given up and the autonomy (validity) of
the waiver. In many cases, this may be impossible to achieve.248
B. Some Initial Thoughts About Application of the Framework to
Other Areas of Law
The autonomy framework proposed above may also provide
valuable insight into waivers in a number of other areas of law.
This part will briefly consider two examples of waivers—one from
the criminal procedure area and one from the contracts area—
and examine whether the theory can explain the outcomes. These
are discrete examples within criminal procedure and contract
law, and a full analysis of waiver in these legal areas is not
attempted. This part will demonstrate that the framework
proposed works descriptively to explain the requirements for
waiver and is normatively appropriate. I will leave it to others,
better qualified, to examine the application of the framework in
more detail.

247. See Hall, supra note 2, at 556–57.
248. In his article arguing for allowing such waivers, Professor Hall stresses that
changes to the current system are necessary before an “economic” theory of informed
consent could be applied, and thus, waivers of this type would be allowed. Id. at 586.
Moreover, Professor Hall notes that there may be some absolute limits of what kinds of
information can be waived, depending on the seriousness of the consequences (for
example, information regarding life-sustaining treatments). Id. at 584–85.
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1. Waivers of Criminal Procedural Rights—Fourth
249
Much of the discussion of
Amendment Consent Searches.
waivers has occurred in the criminal procedure context. This Part
considers specific issues relating to waivers of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights that are involved in consent searches.
These are waivers of a currently functioning right to privacy,
achieved by an individual’s consent to allow a search. I chose the
Fourth Amendment context because, although the law is fairly
settled in this area, the requirements for waiver remain a source
of debate.250 The theory proposed here may help clear up some of
the lingering confusion in this area.
First, no system limitations exist to justify restrictions on
consent search waivers. The language in the Fourth Amendment
251
referring to “unreasonable searches and seizures” indicates that
the system presumably accepts that searches will take place, but
merely attempts to restrict those that are unreasonable. Individual
waivers of privacy in this context (by consenting to searches) are
thus completely compatible with a functioning system. Moreover,
there are no reasons to restrict waivers based on ascriptive
autonomy. The Fourth Amendment, although its inherent notions
of bodily integrity has links to ascriptive autonomy, is intended (as
are most criminal procedural rights) to remedy the imbalance of
power between the state and individuals,252 and thus raises concerns
about descriptive autonomy. In the absence of system or ascriptive
limitations, the issue is whether there are descriptive autonomy
reasons to disallow waivers, or to place particular safeguards
around the waiver process. After considering the three reasons for
across-the-board limitations of waivers of descriptive autonomy, we
can discount them. This is not a situation where a restriction must
be applied in all circumstances—consent in one case does not
necessarily affect the autonomy of another individual to refuse
consent in another case. Therefore, privacy protections can be
waived by an individual without undermining privacy protections
for all other individuals.253
249. I will not address third-party consents. Professor Dix is correct in his assertion
that these are not in fact waivers. See Dix, supra note 2, at 197 n.6.
250. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
211, 220–21 (2002) (describing the requirements for the waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights as an “amorphous standard [that] has proven difficult for lower courts to
implement”).
251. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
252. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1377 (2002) (“In adopting
the [Fourth Amendment], the Framers of our Constitution were primarily concerned with
limiting government power and discretion . . . .”).
253. To some extent, this reasoning may be too simplistic. The fact that one

(2)BERGG1.DOC

2003]

5/28/2003 6:31 PM

UNDERSTANDING WAIVER

337

Second, although obvious power differentials exist between
law enforcement personnel and private citizens, autonomous
waivers can occur in the criminal context. Moreover, this is not
likely to be a situation where evaluations of the autonomy of
waivers in each circumstance would be so costly as to preclude
254
So the issue reduces to an
case-by-case determinations.
analysis of whether there should be specific safeguards
concerning individual waivers.
Unlike waivers in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
context where Miranda warnings assure knowledge, consent
255
searches are not explicitly required to be “knowingly.” The
Court’s rationale seems to be based in part on a distinction
between “those rights guaranteed to criminal defendant to insure
. . . a fair trial and the Fourth Amendment protections which “are
256
of a wholly different order.” The determination of whether to
impose safeguards depends on evaluating the consequences of a
potential non-autonomous wavier. The consequences of an unfair
criminal proceeding (unfair because the defendant was unaware
passenger on a bus consents to a search might have implications on the degree to which
any other passenger feels free to refuse. Such external pressures are not considered
improper, nor should such concerns require an across-the-board restriction on waivers of
privacy.
254. In fact, some might argue that the reverse is true—it would be too costly for the
system to restrict waivers in this context.
255. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973).
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied.
Id.
256. Id. at 241–42. It was also based on practical concerns with how such awareness
would be assured. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (holding that it was
“unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go
before a consent to search may be deemed involuntary”).
The Court seems to believe that an arrestee is a more vulnerable individual, and
thus in need of additional protections. Arguably, however, the individual confronted in the
search situation may be more vulnerable because at least the arrestee is aware that the
police are adversaries, whereas the individual confronted in a search situation may
cooperate in the hopes of maintaining good will (or indicating innocence). If we assume
that it is always a bad idea for a guilty person to consent to a search—but not always a
bad idea to talk to the police—then you might think that consent by a guilty person must
always be the product of coercion, and thus be involuntary. E-mail from Craig M. Bradley,
Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, to Jessica Berg, Assistant
Professor of Law and Bioethics, Case Western Reserve University Schools of Law and
Medicine (July 16, 2002, 10:37 CST) (copy on file with the Houston Law Review). Because
I argue here that voluntariness is a matter of determining which pressures we (society)
will determine to be unfair, the question is really a matter of public policy, not empirical
reality. That is, whether or not all guilty individuals who agree to a search are in fact
agreeing due to improper pressure is a question of how we want to view the pressure in
question, not a question of true free will.
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of any rights he gave up) may be incarcerate an innocent person.
The consequences of an unfair search (unfair because the
individual did not know he could refuse) do not raise the same
concerns about the truth finding.257 This is not to say that a
nonautonomous (due to lack of knowledge) waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights in a consent search does not result in a
diminution of autonomy for the individual in question. Rather,
the significance of this loss has been determined by the Court to
be not great enough to justify imposing disclosure requirements
on law enforcement personnel seeking to conduct the search.258
One possible reason is that individual autonomy generally is
maximized under a system in which law enforcement is able to
gather evidence through consent searches to use against
criminals who, by definition, have often infringed upon another’s
autonomy.259 So, the lessening of autonomy in any particular case
of an unknowing consent allowing a search is offset by the overall
benefits to autonomy of individuals generally by assuring the
most efficient system of law enforcement.
Although the lack of safeguards in the Fourth Amendment
context, when compared with the Fifth Amendment context, can
be explained under an autonomy framework,260 in practice, courts
appear to conflate the requirements of intention and volition—
using the term “voluntary” rather than “autonomous” to
encompass both the absence of coercion and the knowledge
requirements. In a recent Supreme Court decision, United States
v. Drayton,261 police officers requested permission to search bus
262
Although the Court mentioned the knowledge
passengers.
257. In the Fifth Amendment situation, there is a genuine concern about eliciting
false statements (and thus undermining the validity of the judicial process), an issue
relating to the reliability of evidence that is not present in the consent search setting. See
Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 951; Spritzer, supra note 2, at 514; see also Dix, supra
note 2, at 227 (noting that the Court in Bustamonte perceived Fourth Amendment rights
as “serving interests other than accuracy of [the] trial outcome”). Professor Dix, however,
argues that this was incorrect and that “the relevant concern should have been the
importance of the privacy interests protected by the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” Id. at 228.
258. Recall that the baseline in all cases is noninterference. Refer to Part III.C supra.
It is only when the consequences are great enough that there is a basis for imposing
additional requirements or safeguards around the waiver process. Thus, there is an
acceptance in the Fourth Amendment context that some waivers will be unknowing.
259. This excludes crimes that have no victims, such as may be argued in some drug
cases. There is continuing debate about whether such victimless crimes should be
prosecuted. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING xxix (1984).
260. There may be other explanations for this difference.
261. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
262. Id. at 200 (holding that it is not a violation of Fourth Amendment protections
for law enforcement officers to pose questions to, and ask for, consent to search belongings
of individuals, as long as it would be reasonable for them to believe there was a right to
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issues, its analysis improperly focused on whether the officers’
lack of notification that the passengers could refuse permission
was so coercive as to prevent a freely given waiver.263 If the issue
is potential coercion via police misconduct, imposing a warning
requirement is unlikely to have a significant effect.264 In fact, a
number of studies imply that individual susceptibility to
authority is similar in both custodial interrogation (Fifth
Amendment) and search (Fourth Amendment) situations.265
However, if the concern is not with the potential for coercion, but
rather autonomy, there may be less need to assure the autonomy
of the waiver in the Fourth Amendment context. Therefore
different standards of knowledge are appropriate.
Of course this argument assumes that the secondary
analysis of consequences is driven by law enforcement
efficiency goals. If one values distributional goals266 over
efficiency, the disparity between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment context may be more problematic. If more poor
and uneducated individuals waive privacy protections, we
might be more concerned with the consequences of an unfair
waiver via consent to search, than if the focus is merely on the
reliability of evidence. An autonomy framework does not
preclude such an approach. The analysis would be similar, but

refuse).
263. Id. at 206–07. This Article is not arguing that it is inappropriate for the Court to
consider whether the waivers were voluntarily given, only that a warning requirement
does not really facilitate the voluntariness prong of autonomy. Rather, a warning assures
the intention prong is met. Although informing a suspect that her refusal to talk will be
respected may help alleviate some coercion, it is not clear that the warnings effectively
prevent the perception of coercion, or encourage suspects to remain silent. Because courts
have flatly refused to consider whether knowledge safeguards should be applied in the
Fourth Amendment contexts, the result is that they are forced to analyze everything
under voluntariness, even when it may be more appropriate to focus on intention
(knowledge).
264. Recent years have seen the Court retreat from a robust interpretation of
Miranda, perhaps acknowledging that even in the Fifth Amendment context, the
warnings are both of little value in preventing coercion and of minor practical effect in
assuring knowledge. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109,
126 (1998) (“Although the Justices are unlikely to overrule Miranda in the foreseeable
future, one can say fairly that the Court has retreated from the holding of Miranda in
several significant respects.”). Alternatively, it might signal the Court’s tougher stance
regarding criminals and its dissatisfaction with the expanded scope of Miranda.
265. See Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 47 (1974) (describing a study that measured the relative degree of social power
possessed by uniformed authorities); see also John Sabini & Maury Silver, Dispositional
vs. Situational Interpretations of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: “The Fundamental
Attributional Error,” 13 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 147 (1983) (explaining how subjects in
Milgram’s experiment exhibited extreme responsiveness to perceived uniformed authority
figures).
266. “Distributional” here refers to equal or just application of protections and rules.
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would stress that an unfair search and an unfair confession
are equivalent because the consequences disproportionately
limit the autonomy of a vulnerable segment of the population.
Resolution of the debate about which secondary goals to
pursue is beyond the scope of this Article. The point here is
that an autonomy framework functions best in the initial
analysis, and can accommodate a number of secondary factors
including efficiency goals, distributional goals, and others.
2. Contractual Waivers of Statutory Rights. There are
two types of contractual waivers that will be considered here.
The first are waivers of contractual conditions that were
previously created and agreed to by the parties. The second are
waivers of other rights via contract. With respect to the first
situation, the label “waiver” is improperly used in many
contexts.267 Often the term is used to avoid problems with
characterizing the conduct as a contractual “modification,”
although “modification” indeed may be more accurate.268 When
appropriately categorized, for most cases involving the waiver
of a contractual condition created and agreed to by equal and
autonomous parties, basic contractual doctrines of reliance and
269
fairness will control. These doctrines raise concerns about
“other-regarding” effects of the waiver, and as mentioned at
the outset, these effects provide an independent basis for
270
limiting individual waiver decisions.
Absent fairness
concerns, these waivers should be permissible unless the
condition is for the benefit of both parties (thus unwaivable by
one alone because there are implications for both parties’
autonomy),271 or the condition is a material part of the

267. See JOHN S. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED 11 (1917) (describing the misuse of
the term “waiver” when applied to contracts); John S. Ewart, Professor Williston’s Review
of Waiver, 11 MINN. L. REV. 415, 415 (1927) (same); Snyder, supra note 8, at 624–28
(distinguishing the terms “waiver,” “modification,” and “estoppel” in contract law).
268. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.5, at 374–75 (2d
ed. 1990) (commenting on why the term “waiver” may be preferable to the term
“modification” in terms of contract analysis).
269. Id. § 8.5, at 377. This is not incompatible with the autonomy framework.
Essentially, at issue here is whether fully autonomous and equal parties can agree to a
change in a previously executed autonomous agreement. If both parties agree to the
change, the answer should be yes. If only one party seeks to change the agreement, it
should also be allowed, unless the other party has already relied on the agreement and
such change would be unfair. As noted in the beginning of the Article, one individual’s
autonomy may be limited to the extent that its exercise infringes upon another
individual’s autonomy. Refer to notes 32–37 supra and accompanying text.
270. Refer to notes 69–75 supra and accompanying text (explaining “other-regarding”
effects of waiver).
271. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 268, § 8.5, at 374 n.6.
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contract272 (and thus the waiver essentially negates the
contract).273
Of more interest for purposes of this Article is the category
of contractual waivers of rights relating to one party’s autonomy.
One example is the waiver of ascriptive autonomy in contracts for
274
personal services, or contracts involving personal conditions.
Limitations on these waivers are discussed under the heading of
ascriptive autonomy.275 A second example are waivers of
safeguards that have been put in place to promote descriptive
autonomy, such as those designed to remedy disparities in
bargaining power between the parties. Often created as statutory
requirements, they are designed to grant rights to the weaker
party in the transaction,276 and therefore genuine questions of
autonomy are raised when that party seeks to waive the
277
protection.

272. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 85, at 755. Professor Anderson explains that nonwaivable duties between equal parties “are limited to those which go to the essence of the
bargain, such as the basic obligation to perform in good faith, or the provision of some
minimal remedies for breach.” Id. But she clarifies, “[w]here the relative bargaining
power of the parties is unequal, the extent of non-waivable duties implied by law will be
much greater.” Id. The latter limitations, according to Professor Anderson, are prompted
not only by concerns of efficiency, but also with fairness. Id. at 756. But see Kronman,
supra note 14, at 765 (stating that although limits on contractual freedom may be based
on efficiency and fairness, they may also be based on ideas of personal integrity and
notions of sound judgment). The latter two categories coincide with the concepts of
ascriptive and descriptive autonomy.
273. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 268, § 8.5, at 379 (“Parties can most easily waive
conditions that are essentially procedural or technical . . . .”). Conditions that are a
material part of the contract may be dispensed with by dispensing with the contract
altogether. However, such action may be a “waiver” and thus permissible under that
doctrine.
274. The latter category is well demonstrated by a case in which an author
contracted to write a textbook and, in addition, to refrain from drinking during the
drafting. See Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1, 3–4 (N.Y. 1908). This would not be a condition of
which a court could force performance. The author continued to drink, but the court found
that the contract terms were substantially met, and thus, he was due the appropriate
royalties. Id. at 3, 5–6.
275. Refer to Part II.A. supra (describing ascriptive autonomy).
276. Some rules are put in place through state statutes, while others are common
law rules, and others are codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. For a comparison of
the attitude toward contractual waivers of statutory protections between the Lochner era
and the modern Court, see Shell, supra note 17, at 472–74, 477–82.
277. See Thomas G. Kelch & Michael K. Slattery, The Mythology of Waivers of
Bankruptcy Privileges, 31 IND. L. REV. 897, 924 (1998) (noting that “a statutory privilege
may not be waived when there is a strong public policy for the benefit of the general
public underpinning the provision”). This Article argues that the issue is better phrased
as analysis of descriptive autonomy. Thus, statutory protections can be waived if they are
not ones: for which an autonomous waiver would be impossible, which would be too costly
to prove, or which would be lacking sufficient autonomy in the waiver to counterbalance
the protection given up.
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Consider first contractual waivers of employment rights
such as waivers of valid litigation claims, or waivers of litigation
278
For
rights by accepting a mandatory arbitration clause.
example, under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), employees can waive claims for age discrimination in
exchange for severance benefits.279 Among other things, the
statute requires that waivers be “voluntary and knowing” and
imposes specific safeguards to assure the two elements are met.280
These include a disclosure requirement, a waiting period, and a
281
rescission period. The OWBPA was enacted in part to remedy
some disparities of bargaining power between employees and
employers,282 and thus serves to promote descriptive autonomy.
This is not an area where the right must be applied in all cases,
or where autonomous waivers are impossible, or too costly to
analyze. Thus, at issue is whether the waiver in the specific case
should be considered valid. A court determining the validity of a
waiver under the OWBPA should first consider the existence of
improper pressures (constituting coercion) that may render the
waiver involuntary.283 Second, it should consider the
consequences of a non-autonomous waiver and weigh them
against the costs of imposing specific safeguards. In this
situation, the balance has already been determined legislatively
because the statute itself has specific requirements that must be
met for the waiver to be considered valid. Because the
consequences of a waiver of anti-discrimination claims are
significant for both the individual in question and for society as a
whole, which has an interest in minimizing discrimination in

278. See generally Harper, supra note 4, at 1294–98 (discussing the waiver of specific
employment rights); Howard, supra note 4, at 269–73 (examining the waiver of statutorily
guaranteed employment rights); Silverstein, supra note 135, at 484 (introducing the
principle that a waiver of an employment right must be a “knowing and voluntary”
waiver); Ware, supra note 128, at 84–85 (describing the surge in the use of arbitration for
employment disputes and the waiver of litigation rights).
279. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 488; see also Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health
Network, No. 00-4797, 2002 WL 468709, at *41 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2002) (upholding a
waiver of an age discrimination claim under the OWBPA as “knowing and voluntary”).
280. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 488–90.
281. Id. at 489.
282. Id. at 488–89; see also Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 962 (1993).
283. Professor Silverstein argues that the safeguards are not sufficient and should be
more stringent. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 493–94. Specifically, she is concerned that
the safeguards promote knowledge and disregard voluntariness concerns. See id. at 512–
18. This Article has already pointed out the difficulty in putting in place safeguards
against coercion, agreeing that it is problematic if, as Professor Silverstein argues, the
courts are assuming voluntariness in all cases as long as the statutory requirements for
waiver are met. See id. at 525. However, I do not accept her broad definition of coercion.
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employment,284 the imposition of safeguards is appropriate. The
secondary focus here reflects both efficiency and distributive
goals. Allowing individuals to determine whether to waive their
rights based on personal financial gain presumably results in
more efficient outcomes than mandating litigation in all cases.
However, concerns about the distributive (public policy) goals of
anti-discrimination statutes led legislatures to impose safeguards
against nonautonomous waivers.285
Statutory rescission periods for financial contracts provide
286
another example. The federal Truth in Lending Act requires, in
any consumer credit transaction in which a creditor will acquire
a security interest in a person’s principal residence, a mandatory
three-day rescission period.287 In addition, the creditor is
obligated to disclose specific information to the consumer.288 In
289
almost all cases, the rescission period is not waivable. The only
exception arises when the consumer provides a written
statement specifically: (1) describing a bona fide personal
financial emergency, (2) waiving the rescission period, and (3)
signed by all consumers entitled to the rescission period.290 Once
again, this statutory protection is designed to facilitate
descriptive autonomy. Although these are not situations where
the rule must be applied to all cases to function effectively, or
where it would be impossible to conceive of an autonomous
waiver, they are ones where the cost of evaluating each case may
be so expensive or burdensome that an across-the-board
determination is made to restrict waivers. The exception in the
statute indicates a unique situation where an individual’s waiver
decision would be rational, and would prevent additional harm to
the individual. However, the safeguards imposed around such

284. That is, autonomy overall is facilitated under an employment system which
rewards ability rather than race, gender, age, or any other factor; so, safeguards are
warranted in this context.
285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-107 (Michie 2002) (voiding any employee’s
waiver of rights or benefits when the waiver is related to discrimination, obstruction, or
employee payments that are statutorily prohibited); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-645 (1998)
(voiding any waiver of rights that allow employers to discriminate in regard to hiring,
rehiring, or tenure of work); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6A-45 (West 2000) (same).
286. See generally Elwin Griffith, Truth in Lending—The Right of Rescission,
Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount Financed in Closed-End
Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 194 (1998).
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2002). There are generally
state analogs to this statute. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.26 (2002) (discussing
mortgage loan disclosures).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3); Griffith, supra note 286, at 194.
289. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).
290. 12 C.F.R. § 226.31.
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waivers are evidence of the concerns legislatures have with the
consequences of a potential non-autonomous waiver.
Both these examples and others in contract law deserve
more attention than I can afford them within the context of this
Article. The purpose here is simply to show that an autonomy
framework can be used both to explain the differing treatment of
these particular waiver cases and to better understand why
certain types of safeguards were deemed appropriate. The
safeguards chosen should be designed to assure the autonomy of
the waiver, and not merely to serve whatever secondary goal is at
stake.
V. CONCLUSION
Waiver is important in many areas of law, yet there have
been few efforts to develop a unifying theory to govern it. This
Article uses the concept of autonomy both as a descriptive tool to
explain differences in laws relating to waiver and as a normative
theory from which to evaluates the appropriateness of waivers in
different contexts. There are at least two different senses of
autonomy at issue, and these have different implications for the
permissibility of waiver. Furthermore, there are system
constraints here, as in other areas. Although this Article
attempted to apply the framework to different legal areas,
experts in the relative fields are better equipped to develop the
analysis in more detail.
In all areas of law, waivers are useful and should generally
be permitted. Respecting individual waivers respects autonomy.
Limitations on waivers are only appropriate when there are
either system or autonomy justifications. Where the autonomy
given up by the waiver is significant, the waiver itself must
demonstrate a corresponding degree of autonomy to
counterbalance the loss. Evaluation of the autonomy of the
waiver entails two elements—voluntariness and intention.
Evaluation of the autonomy given up as part of the waiver of a
particular right is more difficult, and requires that courts or
legislatures consider the justifications for governmental
interference with individual freedom. As we think about specific
legal rights and the concepts of autonomy, including how to
evaluate the consequences of non-autonomous waivers, we should
gain additional clarification of both when waivers are
appropriate and the need for particular safeguards around the
waiver process.

